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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
When asked why he was so intent on scaling Mount 
Everest, the ill-fated mountaineer George Mallory famously 
replied: “because it’s there.”1  The parties before us have put 
a twist on that philosophy: they have created their own 
mountain of issues and have argued, appealed, and cross-
appealed nearly all of them.2  Unfortunately, if there had been 
a hope of bringing this matter to conclusion any time soon, 
that was dashed when, in the middle of trial, the District 
Court erroneously granted judgment as a matter of law 
against one side, tainting the entire trial and the ultimate 
verdict.  We will therefore vacate the judgment of the District 
Court and remand with instructions for further proceedings.  
We do not take this step lightly, but the error of the District 
Court here was of such magnitude that we seriously doubt the 
correctness of the ultimate verdict. 
 
This case arises from the fractured relationship 
between a large communications equipment manufacturer, 
                                              
1 Climbing Mount Everest Is Work for Supermen, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 18, 1923, at 11. 
 
2 The District Court recognized the battle-every-issue 
character of the litigation.  To one request from counsel to 
“make a record” of his objection, the Court responded: “Make 
a record, go ahead.  The circuit will love it.  It will be the 
5,927th error you have pointed out to them.”  (J.A. 2397.) 
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Avaya Inc. (“Avaya”), and one of its dealers and service 
providers, TLI.3  After they fell out, Avaya aggressively acted 
to block TLI from providing independent maintenance 
services for Avaya equipment.  Meanwhile, the now-
independent TLI took a series of legally dubious actions to 
gain access to Avaya communications systems used by clients 
the parties once shared.  Avaya filed suit, alleging several 
business torts and breach of contract; TLI counter-sued for 
antitrust violations.  After years of pre-trial litigation, and in 
the midst of a months-long trial, the District Court granted 
TLI’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 for 
judgment as a matter of law against Avaya on all of Avaya’s 
affirmative claims.  The Court later instructed the jury that 
none of TLI’s actions could be considered unlawful.  With 
that instruction guiding it, the jury found Avaya liable for two 
antitrust violations and awarded substantial damages. 
 
We conclude that the entry of judgment as a matter of 
law was erroneous.  Given how intertwined the two sides’ 
claims are – and given that Avaya’s antitrust defense relied in 
large part on justifying Avaya’s conduct as a response to 
TLI’s conduct – we also conclude that the erroneous Rule 50 
                                              
3 We use “TLI” as shorthand for a group of small 
service providers that are under common ownership and 
control and are collectively the appellees/cross-appellants.  
They include Telecom Labs, Inc. (“TLI”), TeamTLI.com 
Corp., and Continuant, Inc., along with their common owners 
and managers Douglas Graham, Scott Graham, and Bruce 
Shelby.  Although Continuant seemingly took over the 
businesses’ continuing interests beginning in 2005, TLI was 
the firm most involved in this dispute from the beginning, so 
we use that name for simplicity. 
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judgment infected the jury’s verdict.  We must therefore 
vacate the judgment of the District Court.  A tour of the 
mountain follows. 
 
II. Background 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Avaya, the appellant and cross-appellee, “designs, 
manufactures, sells, and maintains telecommunications 
equipment.”  (Opening Br. at 7.)  Two of its products in 
particular are the subject of this suit.  The first is its private 
branch exchange (“PBX”), which “is essentially a special-
purpose computer ... that functions as a telephone 
switchboard” and is used by “[l]arge organizations needing an 
internal telephone network.”  (Id.)  The second product is its 
predictive dialing system (“PDS”), which is an “automated 
telephone dialing system that uses a predictive algorithm to 
anticipate when the user ... will be able to reach someone, 
improving the chances a call will be answered.”  (Id. at 7-8.)  
The PBX technology was invented in the 1980s by AT&T 
Co., which in 1996 spun its PBX business off to Lucent 
Technologies, Inc., which in turn spun off Avaya in 2000.   
 
TLI and three individuals who operated it are the 
appellees and cross-appellants.  TLI sold post-warranty 
maintenance for Avaya PBXs and PDSs.  At one point, TLI 
was also part of Avaya’s Business Partner program, selling 
communications systems on Avaya’s behalf.  When Avaya 
began downsizing from 1999 to 2001, it encouraged its 
Business Partners to hire laid-off Avaya maintenance 
technicians, even subsidizing that process.  TLI made several 
such hires and began to offer maintenance services in 2001.  
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Not long after, in 2003, TLI and Avaya acrimoniously 
severed their relationship,4 but TLI continued to provide 
maintenance services on Avaya products as an independent 
service provider.    
  
1. PBX Systems and Maintenance 
 
Of the two types of systems at issue in this litigation, 
the PBX has a substantially larger market.  Avaya 
characterizes PBX systems as durable goods with extended 
longevity and high fixed costs.  During much of the time 
relevant to this suit, PBX systems had a useful lifespan of 
about eight years, though some could remain in use for 
decades.5  They have many capabilities but were sold in a 
                                              
4 The reasons for the divorce are, of course, like 
everything else in this case, hotly contested, and they are 
elaborated in more detail below.  Here is a thumbnail sketch: 
Avaya contends that TLI violated its obligations as an Avaya 
agent, whereas TLI alleges that Avaya imposed onerous 
surprise conditions to prevent a partner firm like TLI from 
recouping the investments it had made at Avaya’s request. 
 
5 Those statistics are based on PBXs sold before 2000.  
In the 2000s, traditional PBXs were replaced with systems 
that use internet protocol telephony.  Whereas with older 
“refrigerator-box-type PBXs, it was ... easy to identify and 
define what a ... life of a system was,” with the “IP PBXs ... 
any one server might come out of service, perhaps as quickly 
as after just a couple ... years.”  (J.A. 4382.)   Given the 
constant replacement of equipment on those modern PBXs, it 
is “very difficult to measure” what the lifetime of a system is.  
(Id.) 
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default mode without most of them activated.  Customers 
could then license individual capabilities, depending on their 
needs.  As one Avaya systems engineer explained it at trial, 
Avaya “provide[s] software to our customers that’s able to do 
a vast number of things, but customers don’t want to pay for 
all the things the software can do. ... They may not need all 
the capabilities ... .  So we allow customers to purchase the 
right to use aspects of the software ... .”  (J.A. 1886.) 
 
One of those “aspects” is a set of maintenance 
features6 that was and is licensed separately from the PBX 
system itself.  Those features are accessed via on-demand 
maintenance commands (“ODMCs”).  Users of the 
maintenance features – whether Avaya technicians, non-
Avaya technicians, or customers themselves – access the 
pertinent software using login credentials.  Each login is 
matched to the ODMCs that that specific user is authorized to 
use.  In addition to controlling those logins, Avaya has a 
second way to regulate access to the ODMCs.  The ODMCs 
are only useable on a given PBX system if Avaya has 
activated the corresponding maintenance software 
permissions (“MSPs”).  Avaya’s PBX systems come with the 
MSPs disabled, but customers who execute a specific license 
agreement can have the MSPs, and hence the ODMCs, 
                                                                                                     
 
6 The use of the word “feature” to describe elements of 
the software that enabled remote maintenance is legally 
relevant to questions of contract interpretation in this case.  
See infra Part II.A.2.  We use the word here as a generic term, 
without implying anything about how it should be read in the 
specific context of Avaya’s contracts with its customers. 
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enabled.  Later, when that license terminates, Avaya disables 
the MSPs.   
 
Avaya and its authorized Business Partners offer 
maintenance service, which is a profitable line of business.  
Avaya contends that the “margin on the initial sale of a PBX 
is ‘thin,’” whereas the rate of profit on maintenance work is 
much higher.  (Opening Br. at 8.)  It says that the profit the 
company earns from maintenance is an important source of 
funds for the improvement of PBX systems and the 
development of new models, which are released roughly 
every two years.  According to Avaya, its major competitors 
in this market – Cisco, Siemens, and Microsoft – follow a 
similar business model of low-margin equipment and high-
margin maintenance, and those firms compete with each other 
and with Avaya over the “total cost of ownership” of both 
equipment and maintenance.  (Opening Br. at 9.)   
 
During the time period covered by this litigation, 
Avaya offered three tiers of maintenance options for PBX 
customers.  The highest-end, most expensive option was to 
buy maintenance from Avaya itself, whose technicians had 
full access to ODMCs and certain other Avaya software 
capabilities.   
 
The second, intermediate, option was to purchase 
maintenance from an authorized Avaya Business Partner.  
Business Partners could access a customer’s maintenance 
software through a login called “DADMIN,” once Avaya 
activated it on a customer’s PBX.  As participants in Avaya’s 
maintenance program, Business Partners had to complete 
special training and were given access to engineering support.  
They also had to agree not to solicit maintenance contracts 
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from existing Avaya maintenance customers.  Avaya 
forthrightly admits that it thus imposed vertical restraints on 
maintenance through the Business Partner program to 
encourage the Business Partners to “expand sales of Avaya 
PBXs in the competitive primary market, rather than simply 
to cannibalize existing maintenance business.”  (Opening Br. 
at 13.) 
 
Finally, Avaya offered a self-maintenance option to its 
customers.  Prior to 2008, customers who undertook to 
maintain their own PBX systems would have to purchase a 
license to gain access to the necessary MSPs.  In 2005, out of 
tens of thousands of Avaya PBX customers, about 270 of 
Avaya’s largest customers used the self-maintenance option, 
which allowed their in-house technology departments to 
perform maintenance on their PBX systems.  With its 2008 
hardware release, Avaya began making MSPs part of the base 
package for all PBX purchasers, so that they no longer had to 
pay additional money for access to those maintenance 
features.  They were, however, then subject to heightened 
contractual restrictions against using independent service 
providers (“ISPs”).7   
 
ISPs in fact became a fourth source of maintenance for 
Avaya PBX systems, and – from Avaya’s perspective at least 
– a very unwelcome one.  Avaya has made no secret of its 
                                              
7 The Avaya expert who testified about the change in 
policy suggested that the reason for the change was that the 
features available for purchase on the PBXs had become so 
numerous that Avaya began including many of them by 
default.   
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hostility to ISPs, and it acknowledges that it “has never given 
third parties the logins necessary to access the ODMCs 
needed to maintain PBXs.”  (Opening Br. at 15.)  As Avaya 
characterizes it, prior to 2003, there were no significant ISPs 
on the market, and they did not become noticeable market 
players until 2005.  At that point, Avaya released an internal 
July 2005 bulletin affirming that “Avaya ... does not provide 
maintenance support for clients of or directly to unauthorized 
service providers” (J.A. 7043), and it recapitulated its policy 
that MSPs and self-maintenance licensing would not be 
available to customers who used ISPs.  A 2006 federal court 
opinion rejected an antitrust suit challenging Avaya’s policy 
against giving ISPs maintenance software access.8   
 
In its campaign against ISPs, Avaya updated its 
customer agreements in 2008 to make explicit that PBX 
purchasers agreed not to use unauthorized third parties for 
                                              
8 See United Asset Coverage, Inc. v. Avaya Inc., 409 F. 
Supp. 2d 1008, 1046 (N.D. Ill. 2006).  That court’s analysis 
was critical of the kind of monopolization and tying claims 
now brought by TLI.  Because “the software built into 
Avaya’s PBXs to facilitate their maintenance and repair is 
proprietary,” the court rejected the argument that maintenance 
and hardware were separate antitrust markets.  Id. at 1045-46.  
It also rejected the claim that Avaya had surprised its 
customers with a post-sale policy change, characterizing that 
monopolization claim as “border[ing] on the absurd” because 
“[n]o one has an unclouded crystal ball as to future events, 
nor does anyone have a vested right in the expectation that the 
future will remain the same as the present.”  Id. at 1046. 
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any service that required MSPs.  Specifically, one license 
restriction stated that the 
 
Customer agrees not to ... allow any service 
provider or other third party, with the exception 
of Avaya’s ... resellers and their designated 
employees ... to use or execute any software 
commands that cause the software to perform 
functions that facilitate the maintenance or 
repair of any Product except ... those software 
commands that ... would operate if ... [MSPs] 
were not enabled or activated. 
 
(J.A. 7283.) 
 
2. PDS Systems and Maintenance9 
 
The other Avaya equipment at issue in this case is the 
PDS system, the market for which is substantially smaller 
than the PBX market.  Avaya presented evidence at trial that 
no more than 840 Avaya PDS systems were installed 
nationwide (about 20% of the total PDS market), with Avaya 
providing maintenance service to about 200 of those 
customers.10  PDS systems tend to induce less long-term 
                                              
9 The phrase “PDS system” is redundant (because the 
“S” in PDS is “system”), but we use it for its colloquial ease, 
as the District Court did. 
 
10 Because of the relatively small size of the PDS 
maintenance market, none of Avaya’s Business Partners has 
become a PDS maintenance provider.     
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intra-brand reliance than PBXs because the cost of an entirely 
new PDS is similar to the cost of upgrading an existing 
system.   
 
The PDS market is similar to the PBX market in at 
least one important respect.  In both, Avaya says, the profits 
from maintenance contracts help fund the development of 
new systems and the upgrades of existing systems.  Avaya 
regularly updates its PDS software with patches to “fix bugs 
or adapt the product to changing circumstances.”  (Opening 
Br. at 14.)  Prior to 2007, patches were available for free to 
PDS customers on Avaya’s website; after 2007, customers 
who purchased new PDS systems could only receive patches 
if they purchased a minimum of one year of software support 
from Avaya.   
 
3. The Dispute between Avaya and TLI 
 
The two sides in this case present dramatically 
different stories of their dispute, which began in 2003.11  
Avaya’s story is that it simply enforced long-standing policies 
against a disloyal former contractor that was breaching 
contractual duties and dishonestly undermining Avaya’s 
relationships with its customers.  TLI’s version is that Avaya 
retroactively sprung an anticompetitive policy on its 
customers that prevented them from using ISPs, in order to 
                                              
11 Most issues before us are raised by Avaya, against 
whom the District Court entered judgment as a matter of law 
and against which a verdict was rendered.  Nonetheless, both 
sides have appealed a variety of issues, and we endeavor to 
recount the facts neutrally. 
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vindictively force out of business a competitor who could 
provide better maintenance service at a lower cost. 
 
From 1996 to 2003, TLI was an Avaya Business 
Partner and sold Avaya systems.  Around 2000, Avaya 
launched a program to encourage Business Partners to offer 
maintenance services.  TLI took the opportunity.12  It claims 
it “invested millions in building its maintenance capabilities,” 
while continuing to loyally sell Avaya PBX systems – 
reaching roughly five million dollars in sales in 2002.  
(Answering Br. at 5.)  
 
 The relationship between Avaya and TLI soured that 
same year, over TLI’s efforts to compete for maintenance 
contracts with other Business Partners and with Avaya 
directly.  Avaya had introduced a revised set of obligations 
for its Business Partners, the new program being set forth in 
what Avaya called the “Avaya One” agreement.  The intent 
was to limit intra-brand competition and instead promote 
inter-brand competition by encouraging Business Partners to 
expand the total Avaya market rather than compete with each 
other.  As TLI characterizes it, the Avaya One agreement was 
a malicious surprise sprung on the Business Partners who had 
invested in their maintenance business at Avaya’s 
encouragement and were now restricted in their ability to 
compete for customers to get a return on that investment.   
 
                                              
12 Avaya had laid off many of its service technicians 
and engineers, and it offered to subsidize their salaries if 
Business Partners would employ them and begin to offer 
maintenance services.   
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The formal relationship between Avaya and TLI ended 
in 2003.  TLI had refused to sign on to any agreement that 
would limit its ability to compete for maintenance clients.  
Instead, it negotiated a separate agreement with an Avaya 
agent, under which TLI was exempted from most of the rules 
against competing for existing maintenance business.  When 
higher-ups at Avaya learned of this non-conforming deal, 
they invoked a termination provision of the contract in July 
2003 that allowed them to end the deal on 60-days’ notice.13  
The two sides’ accounts again diverge as to what happened 
next. 
 
According to TLI, Avaya jumped the gun on the 60-
day notice period and began prematurely terminating TLI’s 
access to its clients’ systems, while notifying remaining 
Business Partners that they should poach TLI’s clients.  TLI 
says that Avaya then went on the warpath to sweep away 
ISPs, and that ODMC and MSP access restrictions were 
created to prevent ISPs from competing in the maintenance 
                                              
13 Formally, there were two Avaya One agreements in 
place, one between Avaya and TLI and one between Avaya 
and TeamTLI.com.  For the TLI agreement, Avaya invoked 
the termination clause on July 31, 2003, so that it terminated 
on September 30.  The TeamTLI.com agreement was 
finalized on July 24, Avaya served notice it was cancelling on 
September 24, and the termination was effective 
November 24.  Because the agreement with TLI was the 
principal subject of Avaya’s breach of contract claims, and 
because the District Court analyzed the two contracts in 
tandem, for simplicity we do not address them separately 
because there is no substantive difference that we are aware 
of, and the difference in termination dates is irrelevant.   
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market.  It claims that Avaya would keep customers in the 
dark about restrictions on ISP service until after the customers 
had already purchased an expensive system and were “locked 
in,” at which point Avaya would deliberately misconstrue the 
license contracts to assert that ISP maintenance was 
prohibited.  TLI also accuses Avaya of other supposedly 
anticompetitive conduct, including shortening the PBX 
warranty period in an attempt to force customers to sign up 
for Avaya maintenance contracts and ending a program that 
allowed customers to gain MSP access without using an 
Avaya-authorized provider.  TLI argues that it was the target 
of particularly hostile action by Avaya.  First and foremost, 
TLI alleges that Avaya “sent threatening and misleading 
letters” to TLI’s “current and potential customers, 
discouraging them from doing business” with TLI based on a 
claim that “unauthorized access to the PDS/PBX system 
[was] a violation of federal and state laws,” a claim that TLI 
considers to be “without legal basis.”  (Answering Br. at 9-10 
(internal quotation and editorial marks omitted).)  Throughout 
this litigation, TLI has styled those letters as sowing “fear, 
uncertainty, and doubt” among its customers, and it has 
dubbed that correspondence the “FUD letters” for short.  
Additionally, TLI accuses Avaya of “trespassing on [TLI’s] 
customers’ systems and disabling their access to critical 
maintenance software” (Answering Br. at 10), as well as 
punitively instituting this lawsuit against TLI. 
 
In Avaya’s much different narrative, TLI engaged in 
underhanded tactics to peel off Avaya customers in ways that 
violated both tort law and the contractual obligations of TLI 
and its customers.  According to Avaya, that unlawful 
conduct began when TLI, then still a Business Partner, 
improperly developed a disloyal commercial strategy based 
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on poaching Avaya customers.  After TLI was terminated as a 
Business Partner, it continued to provide maintenance by 
using improperly acquired login credentials – either 
DADMIN logins gleaned from co-opted Business Partners or 
logins from customers who had MSP license agreements.  To 
gain those logins, TLI convinced complicit Avaya Business 
Partners deceptively to submit login credential requests for 
certain TLI customers.  TLI would then disconnect PBX 
systems from phone lines to prevent Avaya from changing the 
login passwords or from deactivating MSPs.  Avaya also 
argues that TLI hired two former Avaya technicians to assist 
in tortious activity, one to “crack” Avaya login passwords and 
one to circumvent security systems in the software.  All told, 
Avaya suggests that TLI made $20-34 million in profit from 
PBX maintenance using unlawfully-acquired access.  This 
lawsuit was initiated as part of Avaya’s efforts to halt TLI’s 
allegedly illicit conduct.   
 
B. Procedural Background 
 
Avaya filed suit on June 2, 2006, alleging a host of 
common law business torts, breach of contract, and violations 
of federal statutes, specifically the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act and the Lanham Act.  It sought both money 
damages and injunctive relief to halt TLI’s practices.  Those 
claims were refined over the following four years, eventually 
resulting in the Fourth Amended Complaint (the 
“Complaint”), filed in February 2010, which presented the 
claims as they went to trial.14  TLI filed counterclaims, 
                                              
14 By the time of that Complaint, Avaya’s claims 
against TLI were, in full, the following: misappropriation of 
trade secrets, tortious interference with contractual relations, 
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alleging numerous common law and federal antitrust 
violations and seeking both money damages and injunctive 
relief against what it considered Avaya’s anticompetitive 
conduct.15   
 
                                                                                                     
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, 
fraud/ misrepresentation, violations of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, false advertising and violations of the Lanham 
Act, trade libel and commercial disparagement, breach of 
contract, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, breach of the 
duty of loyalty, aiding and abetting former Avaya employees’ 
misuse of proprietary information, and conspiracy  
 
15 Specifically, TLI alleged the following antitrust 
violations: monopolization and attempted monopolization of 
the PBX maintenance market in violation of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act, tying PBX maintenance and software patches 
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, tying PBX upgrades 
and maintenance in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 
monopolization and attempted monopolization of the PDS 
maintenance market in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act, 
tying PDS maintenance and software patches in violation of 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act, tying PDS maintenance and upgrades 
in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and conspiracy in 
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.  TLI also asserted 
common law counterclaims: tortious interference with 
business/contractual relations, tortious interference with 
prospective business or economic advantage, injurious 
falsehood and trade libel/slander, and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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Pretrial proceedings lasted for seven years, comprising 
extensive discovery and motions practice, during which many 
of the claims were resolved.  In 2012, TLI’s common law 
claims were all dismissed by summary judgment.  The 
District Court also dismissed TLI’s antitrust claims that 
alleged illegal tying between PBX system upgrades and 
maintenance.  In addition, Avaya voluntarily dismissed its 
federal statutory claims and several of its common law claims 
before trial.16   
 
Some of the issues on appeal concern litigation 
conduct.  TLI accuses Avaya of malicious litigation behavior, 
which allegedly cost TLI “millions of dollars in excess 
litigation costs and delayed resolution of the case for several 
years.”  (Answering Br. at 13.)  Specifically, TLI accuses 
Avaya of abusing the discovery process by making copious 
and unnecessary requests for documents and admissions and 
delivering an excessive number of documents to TLI late in 
the proceedings.  TLI suggests that Avaya knowingly pursued 
meritless claims, namely those that it voluntarily dismissed on 
the eve of trial.  And TLI further alleges that Avaya 
“routinely produced inadequately-prepared corporate 
designees for deposition” (id. at 15), served excessively long 
expert reports, and litigated complex Daubert motions to be 
able to present experts, only to drop the experts and 
“substantial portions” of the expert reports at trial (id. 
(quoting J.A. 352)).  Avaya denies any allegations of bad 
                                              
16 Those claims included misappropriation of trade 
secrets, tortious interference with contractual relations, 
violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
violations of the Lanham Act, trade libel and commercial 
disparagement, and breach of the duty of loyalty.   
22 
 
faith conduct and defends its actions as nothing more than 
vigorous litigation in a complex case.   
 
The trial began on September 9, 2013, opening with 
Avaya’s remaining affirmative claims against TLI – for 
breach of contract, tortious interference with prospective 
economic gain, fraud, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, 
aiding and abetting former Avaya employees’ misuse of 
confidential information, and civil conspiracy.  As the District 
Court described it, Avaya’s “jury presentation [] lasted two 
months, involved 35 witnesses, and spanned over 6,000 pages 
of transcript.”  (J.A. 190.)   
 
TLI then moved for, and the District Court granted, 
judgment as a matter of law as to all of Avaya’s affirmative 
claims.  The gist of the Court’s analysis was that TLI’s 
customers were authorized to use the maintenance commands 
and to give them to TLI, so that TLI could not have breached 
contractual or tort duties by gaining access to those 
commands.   
 
With Avaya’s affirmative case thrown out, TLI then 
proceeded to present its antitrust counterclaims to the jury, 
with that portion of the trial spanning nearly four months.  
When the presentation of evidence concluded, the Court held 
a fifteen-hour conference with the parties to reconcile their 
voluminous proposed jury instructions, eventually settling on 
a set of instructions that ran for 80 pages.  Eight distinct 
antitrust claims ultimately went to the jury.   
 
On March 27, 2014, the jury returned a verdict, finding 
Avaya liable on two of the eight claims: (1) attempted 
monopolization of the PBX maintenance market, in violation 
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of § 2 of the Sherman Act, and (2) unlawfully tying PDS 
software patches to maintenance, in violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  The jury awarded TLI $20 million in damages 
in a general verdict, which the Court trebled to $60 million in 
accordance with 15 U.S.C. § 15(a). 
 
After trial, both sides filed post-trial motions, seeking 
either judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the claims 
now appealed to us, and the District Court denied those 
motions.  TLI also requested an injunction ordering Avaya to 
allow its PBX customers to give ODMC access to ISPs.  The 
Court granted that injunction, but it limited it to PBXs sold 
before May 2008 because Avaya had by then included in its 
sales contracts language to put customers on clear notice that 
they could not use ISPs for maintenance.  Finally, the Court 
granted TLI’s motion for prejudgment interest under the 
Clayton Act, agreeing with TLI on several of its allegations 
that Avaya pursued non-meritorious claims in bad faith to 
prolong litigation.  Ultimately, the District Court entered final 
judgment on September 16, 2014, awarding TLI 
$62,613,052.10.  Avaya timely appealed, and TLI 
conditionally cross-appealed.17 
 
                                              
17 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1332, and 1367.  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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III. Avaya’s Appeals 
 
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law on Avaya’s 
 Common Law Claims 
 
We first take up Avaya’s appeal of the District Court’s 
grant of judgment as a matter of law on its common law 
claims against TLI for tortious interference with prospective 
business advantage, unfair competition, fraud, and breach of 
contract.18  Because all four claims are based on the same 
allegedly illicit conduct by TLI, we begin by providing a 
summary of the evidence of that conduct, as developed at 
trial.  We then apply the state law relevant to each of the four 
causes of action.  For each claim, we conclude that judgment 
as a matter of law was inappropriate. 
 
A motion for judgment as a matter of law under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) “should be granted 
only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmovant and giving it the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference, there is insufficient evidence from 
which a jury reasonably could find liability.”  Lightning Lube, 
Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted). 
 
Credibility determinations, the weighing of the 
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 
inferences from the facts are jury functions, not 
those of a judge.  Thus, although the court 
                                              
18 Avaya does not appeal the grant of judgment as a 
matter of law against its claims for civil conspiracy, aiding 
and abetting a breach of loyalty, and unjust enrichment.   
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should review the record as a whole, it must 
disregard all evidence favorable to the moving 
party that the jury is not required to believe. 
 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 
150-51 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  Given that the District Court heard two months of 
testimony on Avaya’s common law claims, judgment as a 
matter of law could only have been appropriate in the 
extraordinary circumstance that none of that evidence could 
lead a reasonable jury to find that TLI was liable on any one 
of the common law claims. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the order granting the 
motion for judgment as a matter of law, and we apply the 
same standard as the District Court should have.  Lightning 
Lube, 4 F.3d at 1166.  Though the District Court ably 
supervised the introduction of volumes of evidence and was 
attentive in managing this complex case, we cannot help but 
conclude that its decision to grant TLI’s motion for judgment 
as a matter of law was irretrievably flawed.  Avaya provided 
ample proof of conduct that could support its common law 
claims, much of which was uncontroverted and came directly 
from the testimony of TLI executives themselves.  While we 
have high regard for the fine jurist who was at the helm in the 
District Court, this case is a reminder that “judgment as a 
matter of law should be granted sparingly.”  Goodman v. Pa. 
Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 665 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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1. Evidence Supporting Avaya’s  
Common Law Claims 
 
Avaya presented evidence that TLI engaged in conduct 
that was at best ethically dubious, and quite possibly 
unlawful.  To summarize the conduct at issue, it is undisputed 
that TLI enlisted former Avaya employees to “hack” and 
“crack” Avaya systems, that it submitted deceptive requests 
for login access, and that it used Avaya’s proprietary 
knowledge – gained while still Avaya’s Business Partner – to 
compete directly against Avaya.  As a result, TLI was able to 
lure a significant amount of business away from Avaya and 
its Business Partners.  TLI’s surreptitious business dealings 
and its executives’ own admissions of secrecy belie any claim 
that it thought its own conduct was fair and proper.   
 
a. Evidence of Unlawful Activity 
 
i. Hacking and Cracking 
 
The first method TLI used to hack into its clients’ 
Avaya systems was hiring former Avaya employee Dave 
Creswick to crack logins and passwords.  Creswick knew that 
TLI needed the passwords “[t]o do their maintenance” in 
competition with Avaya.  (J.A. 2277.)  He would hack into 
systems and activate MSPs on TLI’s clients’ systems, and he 
also activated DADMIN login access several times.   
 
The evidence introduced at trial of the Creswick 
hacking scheme was copious, and came mostly from the 
testimony of TLI executives themselves.  Chief Technology 
Officer Scott Graham acknowledged that TLI paid Creswick 
to “enable some logins and MSPs” (J.A. 2292) and that it 
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began paying Creswick for this service while TLI was still 
under contract as an Avaya Business Partner.  CEO Douglas 
Graham acknowledged using Creswick as an “ex-Avaya 
employee [to] create a new password for the system[s].”  
(J.A. 2747.)  Avaya introduced an email in which Douglas 
Graham offered Creswick “a flat rate of $300 a password for 
single situations and $200 a password if you do more [than] 
one password at a time.”  (J.A. 6117.)  In another email, 
Creswick bragged to Douglas Graham that “there has not 
been [an Avaya PBX] system created that I cannot get into.”  
(J.A. 6059.)  TLI eventually developed additional means to 
access Avaya PBXs, and by 2008, it had begun to “read [] 
passwords” for itself, using a method similar to (but simpler 
than) Creswick’s.  (J.A. 2361.) 
 
 TLI also hacked Avaya systems by hiring another 
former Avaya employee, Harold Hall, who used software 
“provided by Avaya” during his time as an Avaya employee 
to “beat” Avaya’s security systems.  (J.A. 2293).  Hall had 
taken the software, called an “ASG key,” with him when he 
left Avaya’s employment.  He acknowledged at trial that he 
did not receive permission from Avaya to do so.  Scott 
Graham admitted that Hall’s method was necessary to 
overcome “an additional security method that was 
implemented by Avaya on certain releases of the ... PBX 
software.”  (J.A. 2365.)  He conceded that he knew “Hall had 
[software] provided to him by Avaya” and that he “believe[d] 
[Hall] used it through most of his career at Avaya” before 
using that software “subsequently as a contractor.”  (J.A. 
2366.)  In his own testimony, Hall estimated that he had used 
the ASG key for TLI “40 [to] 60” times.  (J.A. 3057.) 
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ii. Deceptive Access  
 Requests 
 
The second way that TLI gained access to Avaya’s 
PBX systems was to cajole Avaya Business Partners into 
submitting deceptive requests for login access.  As Scott 
Graham characterized it, TLI would “work[] with several 
Business Partners” to have them “submit[] a DADMIN form 
at the customer’s request” – but, unbeknownst to Avaya, TLI 
would be the ultimate user.  (J.A. 2293.)  Graham 
acknowledged that, if Avaya had known that TLI was behind 
the request, it would not have enabled the DADMINs because 
Avaya was “doing everything [it] could to put [TLI] out of 
the maintenance business.”  (J.A. 2338.)  Therefore, as 
Graham put it, the submissions “did not identify [TLI] on 
there” and “did not have [TLI’s] name on there to identify to 
Avaya that [the customer] was also a customer of [TLI’s].”  
(J.A. 2338.)  In response to an interrogatory, TLI identified 
seven Business Partners who cooperated in the scheme to 
send access requests “that resulted in the activation of 
DADMIN logins” that were used by TLI.  (J.A. 3041.)   
 
iii. Disloyal Use of 
Knowledge Gained As 
Avaya Business Partner 
 
TLI’s third method for surreptitiously gaining access 
to Avaya systems was to rely on proprietary information 
learned when it was under contract as an Avaya Business 
Partner.  Scott Graham testified that “108 locations or about 8 
percent” of the PBX systems that TLI serviced “were systems 
for which TLI provided maintenance using a login that it had 
obtained from Avaya when TLI was a Business Partner.”  
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(J.A. 2423.)  An additional “17 percent” of TLI’s 
maintenance business was for “systems that were ... using a 
default login or password.” (J.A. 2424.)  TLI “did indeed 
learn of [those default passwords] during the time that [TLI 
was] a Business Partner.”  (J.A. 2332.) 
 
iv. Subjective Knowledge of 
 Wrongful Conduct 
 
Avaya also presented evidence that TLI knew that 
Avaya considered maintenance access to be proprietary and 
that TLI deliberately acted in secret to gain system access, 
from which a jury could infer malice or bad faith.  Scott 
Graham admitted in his testimony that TLI “hid [its] activities 
from Avaya” and that the information about how TLI gained 
access was “carefully guarded” when dealing with customers 
– though he denied providing customers with affirmatively 
false information.  (J.A. 2293-94.) 
 
TLI actually went to great lengths to conceal its 
activities from Avaya.  Scott Graham acknowledged that if 
Avaya knew that TLI was behind the vicarious DADMIN 
login requests, it would not have provided them.  
Accordingly, TLI would have customers sign blank request 
forms and would not disclose to them the identity of the 
Business Partner that would actually submit the form, because 
“if the Business Partner was identified to the customer, that 
could get back to Avaya.”  (J.A. 2345.)  TLI believed (no 
doubt rightly) that if Avaya learned of that practice, it would 
have intervened to stop the unauthorized access.   
 
As for the hacking schemes, Douglas Graham 
acknowledged that “it was very important to [TLI] that Avaya 
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didn’t know about Mr. Creswick.”  (J.A. 2748.)  In an email, 
Graham wrote that one way TLI got “access to [Avaya] 
systems” was “having an ex-Avaya employee create a new 
password for the system,” and he suggested that “[i]f [Avaya] 
knew of” the manner in which TLI was getting access, it 
“would probably be raising it” in litigation.  (J.A. 6363-64.)  
TLI executive Bruce Shelby testified that TLI would make 
customers sign non-disclosure agreements before revealing 
who its subcontractors were, for fear that Avaya would find 
out and “put pressure on all the Business Partners that were 
on our subcontractor list not to work with us.”  (J.A. 2986.)  
He also testified that TLI did not want Avaya “to find out ... 
how TLI was gaining access to the on-demand maintenance 
commands.”  (J.A. 2997-98.) 
 
Testimony also established that TLI acted to obfuscate 
its practices when dealing with its own customers.  For 
example, when Avaya changed its customer contract 
language regarding DADMIN access, Scott Graham sent an 
email to TLI leadership suggesting a tactic to conceal the 
firm’s methods: 
 
In light of Avaya’s recent changes in 
contract language regarding [DADMIN] 
specifically, we want to eliminate that word 
from our vocabulary when talking to customers. 
 
When we refer to logins - we want to 
simply refer to them as “service logins[.”]  ... 
 
Obviously, some customers will ask 
pointed enough questions, that we will need to 
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be more descriptive, but as a default we want to 
change our message. 
 
(J.A. 5817.)  The obfuscation apparently worked; in fact, two 
of TLI’s customers testified that they did not know that TLI 
was not an authorized maintenance provider when they hired 
the firm.     
 
TLI also took preemptive actions to prevent Avaya 
from interrupting its activities.  According to Scott Graham’s 
testimony, TLI knew that the MSPs were licensed by Avaya 
to each customer and that the licenses “all implied” that 
“Avaya could shut [the MSPs] off” at the end of a customer’s 
contractual relationship with Avaya.  (J.A. 2382.)  Therefore, 
as Douglas Graham put it in an email, TLI would “tak[e] over 
the system” of a customer it had successfully solicited, 
“before Avaya ha[d] time to turn the [MSPs] off, or change 
the passwords,” which was “simply done by disconnecting 
the phone line that links Avaya to the customer’s system.”  
(J.A. 6363.)  Similarly, Harold Hall testified that he would 
access the Avaya systems using the DADMIN logins he had 
cracked with the software he had walked away with when he 
quit Avaya, and then he would change the DADMIN 
password.  He testified that the practice was a “routine thing” 
that TLI did, and that it ensured that “nobody other than [TLI 
could] access that [system] using the DADMIN login.”  (J.A. 
3055.)  One TLI employee testified that she was instructed to 
tell customers who were cancelling a contract with Avaya to 
“change the line that they had in place” and to “change a 
password,” all “so that Avaya couldn’t access the system.”  
(J.A. 2463.) 
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b. Harm to Avaya 
 
All of the common law claims at issue have as an 
element that Avaya establish actual damages resulting from 
TLI’s unlawful activity.  At trial, Avaya presented evidence 
of several avenues through which TLI’s alleged 
misappropriation of maintenance access caused it financial 
harm. 
 
First, Avaya lost license revenue when TLI provided 
the misappropriated access to its customers, who would 
otherwise have had to license access from Avaya.  Scott 
Graham testified that TLI provided customers with logins that 
went beyond the base customer logins.  Douglas Graham 
testified to a specific instance in which TLI provided a high-
level password to a client so that the client would “not have to 
pay Avaya for MSPs.”  (J.A. 2720.)  Shelby testified that TLI 
would “tell prospective customers that they did not need to 
pay for MSPs if they were to become a TLI maintenance 
customer,” “because [TLI] had another method to gain 
access.”  (J.A. 3033.) 
 
Second, TLI would itself sell passwords to customers, 
as was established by Douglas Graham’s testimony.  He 
described how TLI charged “setup fees” for customers who 
needed a new password.  (J.A. 2750.)  Also, “[t]here was a 
time where [TLI] would charge customers if [TLI] had to get 
a second password.”  (J.A. 2750.)  That TLI revenue gained 
by selling Avaya’s proprietary information could be a basis 
for disgorgement damages. 
 
Third, and most importantly, the allegedly 
misappropriated access enabled TLI to compete directly with 
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Avaya for maintenance customers, costing Avaya profit in its 
high-margin maintenance business.  Scott Graham testified 
that, from 2001 on, TLI competed with Avaya for 
maintenance dollars.  Douglas Graham acknowledged that, 
since that time, TLI “marketed ... its own maintenance, to 
existing Avaya maintenance customers,” and he identified 
one customer in particular that TLI “took over” from Avaya.  
(J.A. 2704-05.)  Shelby acknowledged that TLI “targeted 
PBX owners with existing maintenance contracts because 
they were the ones ... who were most likely to spend money 
on PBX maintenance.”  (J.A. 2983.)  He also stated that, of 
those existing maintenance contracts, “[t]he vast majority 
were with Avaya.”  (J.A. 2983.) 
 
Avaya presented evidence that TLI’s ability to 
compete for that business depended on the maintenance 
access that Avaya contends was misappropriated.  Scott 
Graham agreed that “unless [TLI] could access the 
maintenance commands built into the software, [it] couldn’t 
... do the maintenance.”  (J.A. 2385.)  He also stated that 
“[s]ome of the services” offered by TLI for the PBX 
maintenance at issue “do require the maintenance 
commands.”  (J.A. 2294.)  And he acknowledged that 
“generally” the commands at issue “can’t be executed by a 
customer level login with no MSPs,” hence requiring a 
higher-level login of the type that was gained by the various 
means just described.  (J.A. 2294.)19 
                                              
19 Avaya presented a specific example through the 
testimony of one maintenance client who was courted by TLI.  
That witness testified that his firm had traditionally used 
Avaya maintenance (either directly or through Business 
Partners), switched to TLI under the mistaken belief that it 
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The competition for business was especially costly to 
Avaya because maintenance was a major driver of the profits 
from its PBX and PDS systems.20  Avaya’s profit margin on 
the sale of PBX systems was substantially lower than its 
profit margin on the whole range of maintenance products.  
                                                                                                     
was a Business Partner, then terminated that arrangement 
upon discovering that TLI was not “able to provide [them] 
with the proper login credentials to support and administer the 
system” and thereafter “went back to Avaya for support.”  
(J.A. 2510.)  Avaya therefore presented not only generalized 
evidence that TLI’s maintenance contracts were at Avaya’s 
expense, but a concrete example of how that substitution 
worked. 
 
20 Indeed, Douglas Graham noted in an email that 
Avaya would frequently take losses in order to retain its 
extant maintenance contracts, another facet of TLI’s 
competitive strategy: 
TLI continues to have significant success in 
taking over existing Avaya maintenance 
contracts.  Even when TLI loses, in most cases 
Avaya has to take a significant loss to win the 
deal.  For example, TLI just lost International 
Paper.  At the time of TLI’s proposal, 
International Paper was paying Avaya over 
$4,000,000 a year.  TLI’s proposal was for 
$2,800,000 a year.  I have not gotten all the 
details, but I am confident that Avaya had to 
partner with a Business Partner and take a 
significant loss to keep TLI from winning this 
deal. 
(J.A. 6363.) 
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Even if Avaya did not retain the customer as a direct service 
client, the two other authorized routes for customers to obtain 
maintenance service – purchasing service from a Business 
Partner or purchasing licenses for self-maintenance – would 
also have benefited Avaya financially.  As an Avaya 
executive testified, when a customer signs on with a Business 
Partner, it becomes a “customer ... that [Avaya] can look to 
sell additional products to.”  (J.A. 2065)  In some cases, the 
Business Partner would in turn sell Avaya maintenance 
service, providing direct revenue to Avaya.  Even if the 
Business Partner sold its own branded maintenance, any such 
service was “going to ... include[] ... some Avaya content,” 
hence yielding business for Avaya.  (J.A. 2569.) 21 
 
Moreover, if the jury credited Avaya’s case, it would 
have been able to apportion damages to different conduct, 
because it had evidence of TLI’s total maintenance earnings 
and the proportion of maintenance attributable to each form 
of allegedly unlawful access.  Avaya’s accounting expert 
testified that, depending on which profit model was believed 
(the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s), TLI made between 
$20,260,092 and $31,160,190 from its maintenance of Avaya 
PBX systems between 2003 and 2010.  TLI’s own analysis 
concluded that its maintenance services were based on logins 
procured in the following proportions: 8% was “obtained 
                                              
21 Not incidentally, a maintenance relationship either 
directly with Avaya or with an authorized Business Partner 
also allowed Avaya to assert quality control over 
maintenance, which helped protect the value of Avaya’s 
brand reputation.  When it came to independent providers, 
Avaya was “concerned about the quality of maintenance 
service that the customer receives.”  (J.A. 2065.) 
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from Avaya when TLI was a Business Partner” (J.A. 2423); 
1% was using “a well-known Business Partner password” 
(id.); 5% was based on deceptive requests from other 
Business Partners; 24% was “obtained through Mr. 
Creswick” (J.A. 2424); 28% was “using a login that the 
customer had provided it access to” (id.); 17% was obtained 
through a “default login or password” (id.); and 16% was 
“obtained internally,” including “through use of the known 
key with Mr. Hall” and TLI’s internally-developed cracking 
method (id.).  If the jury found each of those courses of 
conduct to be unlawful, the total would account for 99% of 
the profit that TLI garnered from its Avaya PBX maintenance 
business.  Even limiting the analysis to just the more 
obviously problematic conduct – deceptive log-in requests, 
hacking and cracking, and using passwords TLI gained as a 
Business Partner – it accounts for 53% of TLI’s business. 
 
With all the foregoing considerations taken together, 
we conclude that Avaya presented substantial evidence that, 
but for TLI’s competition, made possible only by its alleged 
theft of proprietary information, Avaya would have received a 
significant portion of the money TLI’s clients spent on 
maintenance.  Further, it would have been feasible for the 
jury to attribute particular losses to particular conduct. 
 
2. Customer Contract Interpretation 
 
In granting judgment as a matter of law to TLI on 
Avaya’s common law claims, the District Court largely relied 
on its ruling that Avaya’s contracts with its equipment 
customers entitled those customers to give TLI access to their 
systems to perform maintenance.  The District Court ruled 
that, as a matter of law, “Avaya failed to prove the software 
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licensing agreements entered into by TLI’s 470 customers 
upon purchasing their PBXs prohibited them from allowing 
TLI[] to access the ODMCs on their systems.”  (J.A. 201.)  
Because that threshold legal determination was so central to 
the rest of the District Court’s analysis, we turn to considering 
whether it was correct. 
 
There is no dispute that New Jersey law governs this 
issue, according to the choice of law provision in the 
customer contracts, and under New Jersey law, “discerning 
contractual intent is a question of fact unless the provisions of 
a contract are wholly unambiguous.”  Jaasma v. Shell Oil 
Co., 412 F.3d 501, 507 (3d Cir. 2005) (interpreting New 
Jersey law) (internal quotation marks and modifications 
omitted) (quoting In re Barclay Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 75, 78 
n.3 (3d Cir. 1984)).  “An ambiguity in a contract exists if the 
terms of the contract are susceptible to at least two reasonable 
alternative interpretations.”  M.J. Paquet, Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of 
Transp., 794 A.2d 141, 152 (N.J. 2002) (quoting Nester v. 
O’Donnell, 693 A.2d 1214, 1220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997)).  When that is so, it is permissible to look to evidence 
outside the contract “as an aid to interpretation.”  Chubb 
Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 948 A.2d 1285, 
1289 (N.J. 2008) (citation omitted). 
 
 Two sets of license agreements are in dispute, those 
before and those after 2007.  Each is the subject of a distinct 
question.  For the pre-2007 agreements, the question is 
whether it was ambiguous that they permitted licensees – i.e., 
Avaya customers – to provide access to ISPs.  The post-2007 
agreements unambiguously barred giving such access, but it 
is disputed whether Avaya’s customers actually entered into 
those agreements.  We conclude that, for both sets of 
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agreements, Avaya presented sufficient evidence to at least 
create disputes of material fact, so that those questions should 
have been answered by the jury, not the Court. 
 
In ruling that PBX license agreements unambiguously 
gave purchasers a right to use maintenance commands and to 
provide access to third parties, the District Court relied on 
language from the “Purchase/Service Agreement.”  The 
Court’s conclusion was based on a provision in “[l]icensing 
agreements used from 1990 to 2003,” which “granted the 
purchaser ‘a personal, non-transferable and non-exclusive 
right to use ... all software and related documentation 
furnished under this agreement.’”  (J.A. 204 (quoting license 
agreement, an example of which is at J.A. 5856).)  In the 
District Court’s reading, that language gave Avaya PBX 
customers a “personal ... right” to use MSPs, which the Court 
viewed as “software ... furnished under this agreement.”  In 
the Court’s view, that right to use MSPs extended to the 
customer’s maintenance provider, whether an employee or an 
independent contractor such as TLI.22 
                                              
22 In 2003, Avaya updated the agreements.  It left the 
quoted language in place but added a new clause stating that 
the “[c]ustomer will make the Software available only to 
employees, contractors, or consultants with a need to know, 
who are obligated to comply with all license restrictions 
contained in the Agreement and to maintain the secrecy of the 
Software.”  (E.g., J.A. 5241.)  The District Court interpreted 
the language about “contractors[] or consultants” to be 
“consistent with the ... construction of licensing agreements 
that allow third-party use for the licensee’s benefit.”  (J.A. 
205 n.26.)  It therefore considered that contract term to be 
evidence that PBX owners were permitted to use independent 
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Avaya challenges the District Court’s interpretation of 
those agreements, arguing that the MSPs required to perform 
maintenance were not in fact “furnished under” the 
Purchase/Service Agreement, so that customers did not have a 
“right to use” them.  (Opening Br. at 30.)  Instead, MSPs 
were “licensed separately through an MSP Addendum ... or 
Maintenance Assist agreement.”  (Id.)  “Avaya delivered new 
equipment with MSPs turned off, enabled them only if 
customers signed a separate ... agreement, and disabled them 
if that agreement expired.”  (Id.)  Although customers could 
maintain their PBX systems without MSPs, it was “just not as 
efficient” to do so without the remote access that MSPs 
allowed (J.A. 1995) – hence the value of executing an 
agreement to activate MSPs. 
 
We do not need to answer who has the better reading 
of the contracts because, at a minimum, they are ambiguous, 
and the District Court erred in ruling that Avaya’s reading is 
untenable.  MSPs may have been embedded in the software 
given to customers, but customers’ ability to access them 
required a separate purchase from Avaya.  If the District 
Court’s interpretation were correct, then any time a customer 
downloaded a piece of software that had components 
requiring additional payment and permissions, courts would 
treat the entire software and all its components as having been 
“furnished” to the customer in the original purchase.  That is 
questionable, and the contrary interpretation is, at the very 
least, plausible.  Moreover, given that Avaya’s business 
model was dependent on selling base equipment and then 
licensing and enabling additional features such as MSPs, the 
                                                                                                     
contractors for maintenance and to provide them with system 
access. 
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conclusion that those features were unambiguously meant to 
be “furnished” in the base purchase is far from clear.  As 
Avaya points out, “[h]undreds of self-maintenance customers 
paid Avaya for ... access commands,” which would “make no 
sense if the Purchase/Service Agreements already entitled 
customers” to them.  (Opening Br. at 32.)  Avaya, its 
customers, and even TLI did not read the agreements that way 
before the lawsuit, and the District Court erred in declaring 
that the terms were unambiguously contrary to all the parties’ 
understandings.   
 
Avaya also notes that in 1999, the agreements were 
modified to include a provision that a customer “will not 
enable or attempt to permit any third party to enable software 
features or capacity (e.g. additional storage hours, ports, or 
mailboxes) which Avaya licenses as separate products 
without Avaya’s prior written consent.”  (J.A. 205 n.24.)  
Based on that language, Avaya argues that customers were 
barred from allowing an ISP to enable features, such as 
MSPs, without Avaya’s consent.  The District Court, 
however, did not consider that provision to apply to MSPs.  It 
read the list of enumerated examples – “storage hours, ports 
..., and voice mailboxes” – to be “clearly incongruous” with 
MSPs.  (Id.)  Accordingly, the Court ruled that MSPs were 
unambiguously not a “feature[] or capacity” subject to the 
provision’s restrictions. 
 
For much the same reasons that we disagree with the 
District Court’s construction of the “furnished under” 
language, we also conclude that it was improper to determine 
that terms “features or capacit[ies]” were unambiguous and 
did not apply to MSPs.  Storage hours, additional ports, and 
mailboxes are some examples of the add-ons that Avaya 
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licensed separately, but MSPs and ODMCs that provided 
remote maintenance access might rationally be viewed by a 
jury as being just as much “features” that enhance a 
customer’s use of a PBX system.23  Not only did customers’ 
behavior provide some corroboration of Avaya’s 
interpretation of the contract, TLI’s did as well.  If the 
agreements unambiguously permitted customers to give TLI 
access to MSPs, there would have been little reason for its 
secretive efforts to gain maintenance access.  Indeed, Scott 
Graham was asked at trial whether he “knew that MSPs were 
not part of the original sale of the PBX to the customers,” and 
he responded: “Yes, and that was one of the big problems.”  
(J.A. 2303.)  In light of the imprecision of the words 
“features” and “capacity” and the extrinsic evidence 
                                              
23 TLI argues that, in Avaya’s “detailed ‘feature’ 
manuals,” Avaya “did not once identify MSPs as a ‘feature.’”  
(Answering Br. at 84 (citing J.A. 2407).)  We agree that 
testimony about those features manuals, and the absence of 
any mention of MSPs in them, would be relevant for the jury 
to consider in interpreting the meaning of the 1999 
modifications.  But, as an Avaya system engineer put it at 
trial, the PBX software is “able to do a vast number of 
things,” and customers could pick and choose which “aspects 
of the software” to purchase.  (J.A. 1886.)  That Avaya chose 
to highlight more glamorous capacities in its features manuals 
– instead of intermediate commands and functions that 
allowed remote-access maintenance – does not foreclose a 
jury determination that such access was indeed a feature of 
the product.  Given that so few customers performed their 
own maintenance, that lack of emphasis may make perfect 
sense to a jury. 
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supporting Avaya’s interpretation of the contract, we 
conclude that the District Court erred in ruling as a matter of 
law that the 1999 additions to Avaya’s PBX contracts 
unambiguously did not apply to MSPs. 
 
Having resolved that the District Court erred in 
construing the pre-2007 customer contracts to be 
unambiguously contrary to Avaya’s interpretation, we turn to 
the post-2007 agreements.24  The District Court 
acknowledged that the 2007 version of the licensing 
agreement clearly “obligated the purchaser to refrain from 
using a third-party maintenance provider,”25 but it ruled that 
“Avaya did not introduce any evidence indicating that [TLI’s] 
                                              
24 The District Court made note of the fact that only 
“eight out of [TLI’s] 470 customers purchased their PBXs in 
2007 or after,” and that the 2007 contract modification “came 
into existence well after Avaya initiated the instant suit in 
June of 2006.”  (J.A. 206-07 n.27.)  Although allegedly 
unlawful access to post-2007 systems may not have been a 
large contributor of TLI’s business or the motivation for 
Avaya’s suit, that goes to the question of damages, not 
liability. 
 
25 The agreement provided that the “[c]ustomer agrees 
not to ... allow any service provider or third party, with the 
exception of Avaya’s authorized channel resellers and their 
designated employees ... to use or execute any software 
commands that cause the software to perform functions that 
facilitate the maintenance or repair of any Product except that 
a service provider ... may execute those software commands 
that ... would operate if ... [MSPs] were not enabled or 
activated.”  (J.A. 7283.) 
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customers signed such a licensing agreement, and 
consequently this iteration of the agreement cannot be used to 
prove that [TLI’s] customers were prohibited from granting 
TLI[] access to the ODMCs on their PBXs.”  (J.A. 206.)  
Again, the Court was wrong. 
 
Avaya did present sufficient evidence to establish a 
dispute of material fact, which should have gone to the jury.  
The form agreement itself was in evidence, and an Avaya 
employee testified that the standard form agreements as of 
2008 included the specific reference restricting use of MSPs.  
That employee also explained that the forms were crafted by 
a “forms committee” that ensured that uniform terms and 
conditions were “incorporated into the templates,” which 
were then incorporated into “procedures under which [Avaya] 
used form agreement[s]” for PBX equipment, software, and 
maintenance sales.  (J.A. 2615.)  Given the evidence of 
Avaya’s centralized form-drafting procedure, an example of 
an actual prototypical form, and examples of earlier 
generations of forms that were in fact signed by customers, a 
jury could have reasonably found that the post-2007 form 
agreements were in fact reflective of PBX purchasers’ license 
obligations.  It was thus improper for the District Court to 
resolve the question as a matter of law rather than leave it to 
the jury. 
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3. Tortious Interference with Prospective 
 Business Advantage 
 
We now turn to the specific claims that Avaya asks us 
to revive.  We first consider count three of its Complaint, in 
which Avaya set forth a claim for tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage.   
 
As a federal court sitting in diversity, and as is 
undisputed by the parties, we are obligated to apply New 
Jersey’s law to the tort claims.  See Lorenzo v. Pub. Serv. 
Coordinated Transp., 283 F.2d 947, 948 (3d Cir. 1960) (per 
curiam).  In Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics 
Corp., the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that, in a claim 
of tortious interference with prospective business advantage, 
“[w]hat is actionable is ‘[t]he luring away, by devious, 
improper and unrighteous means, of the customer of 
another.’”  563 A.2d 31, 36 (N.J. 1989) (quoting Louis 
Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 175 A. 62, 66 (N.J. 1934)).  To prevail 
on such a claim, Avaya “was required to show [1] that it had 
a reasonable expectation of economic advantage, [2] which 
was lost as a direct result of [TLI’C’s] malicious interference, 
and [3] that it suffered losses thereby.”  Ideal Dairy Farms, 
Inc. v. Farmland Dairy Farms, Inc., 659 A.2d 904, 932 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (citation omitted).26 
                                              
26 We earlier parsed New Jersey law to further 
subdivide the tort, essentially by breaking out the second part 
of the Ideal Dairy Farms formulation into three elements.  As 
we put it then, the tort comprised five elements: 
1) a plaintiff’s reasonable expectation of 
economic benefit or advantage, (2) the 
defendant’s knowledge of that expectancy, (3) 
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In terms of the first element – protectable economic 
expectations – the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that 
“[i]t is not necessary that the prospective relation be expected 
to be reduced to a formal, binding contract,” and that such 
prospective relations include “the opportunity of selling or 
buying land or chattels or services, and any other relations 
leading to potentially profitable contracts.”  Printing Mart, 
563 A.2d at 39 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 766B cmt. c (1979)).  Courts have found “a reasonable 
expectation of economic gain in as slight an interest as 
prospective public sales.”  Id. at 38 (collecting cases). 
 
Protectable economic expectations can arise from both 
existing and potential customers.  “Tortious interference 
developed under common law to protect parties to an existing 
or prospective contractual relationship from outside 
interference.”  Id. at 38 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  
Satisfaction of the first element does not turn on whether the 
customer is characterized as current or prospective, but rather 
whether the facts of the case “giv[e] rise to some ‘reasonable 
                                                                                                     
the defendant’s wrongful, intentional 
interference with that expectancy, (4) in the 
absence of interference, the reasonable 
probability that the plaintiff would have 
received the anticipated economic benefit, and 
(5) damages resulting from the defendant’s 
interference. 
Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 186 
(3d Cir. 1992) (citing Printing Mart, 563 A.2d at 37; 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766B)). 
 
46 
 
expectation of economic advantage.’”  Id. at 37 (quoting 
Harris v. Perl, 197 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1964)).27 
The second element – malicious interference – requires 
only “the intentional doing of a wrongful act without 
justification or excuse.”  Id. at 39 (quoting Louis Schlesinger 
Co. v. Rice, 72 A.2d 197, 203 (N.J. 1950)).  Wrongful 
conduct, always viewed in the specific context of the case 
presented, is generally defined by reference to custom in the 
industry.  It is conduct that “would not be sanctioned by ‘the 
rules of the game.’”  Id. at 40.  “[T]he line must be drawn 
where one competitor interferes with another’s economic 
advantage through conduct which is fraudulent, dishonest, or 
illegal.”  Ideal Dairy Farms, 659 A.2d at 936 (citation 
omitted).  A benign, or pro-competitive, motive does not 
absolve misconduct.  “While competition may constitute 
justification, a defendant-competitor claiming a business-
                                              
27 Printing Mart illustrates how broad a protectable 
prospective economic advantage may be.  The corporate 
plaintiff had performed printing services for Sharp 
Electronics for several years.  When Printing Mart submitted 
a bid on the latest Sharp project, there was evidence that 
Sharp employees rigged the bidding process to enable a 
Printing Mart competitor to win the contract.  Printing Mart 
sued Sharp, three of its employees, and three competitors for 
intentional interference with prospective economic relations.  
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the basis that no 
contract obligated Sharp to do business with Printing Mart.  
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed, holding that, 
although a complaint based on tortious interference must 
allege facts that show a protectable right, the right “need not 
equate with that found in an enforceable contract.”  Printing 
Mart, 563 A.2d at 37. 
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related excuse must justify not only its motive and purpose 
but also the means used.”  Id. at 933 (citation omitted). 
 
In Lamorte Burns & Co. v. Walters, the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey held that the “taking of plaintiff’s 
confidential and proprietary property and then using it 
effectively to target plaintiff[’s] clients, is contrary to the 
notion of free competition that is fair.”  770 A.2d 1158, 1172 
(N.J. 2001).  In that case, two of Lamorte’s employees 
collected information on its clients with the purpose of using 
it to start their own business in direct competition with 
Lamorte.  Id. at 1162.  The court held that such conduct was 
sufficient to make out a claim of tortious interference, so that 
the targeting of a company’s current clients was sufficient to 
ground a tortious interference claim.  Id. at 1172. 
For a plaintiff to establish the third element, loss and 
causation, there must be “proof that if there had been no 
interference there was a reasonable probability that the victim 
of the interference would have received the anticipated 
economic benefits.”  Printing Mart, 563 A.2d at 41 (quoting 
Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 384 A.2d 859, 865 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1978)).  As the Appellate Division of the New 
Jersey Superior Court has explained, “[i]t is sufficient that 
plaintiff prove facts which, in themselves or by the inferences 
which may be legitimately drawn therefrom, would support a 
finding that, except for the tortious interference by the 
defendant with the plaintiff’s business relationship with 
[another party], plaintiff would have consummated the sale 
and made a profit.”  McCue v. Deppert, 91 A.2d 503, 505-06 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952). 
 
The District Court here decided that TLI’s access was 
not itself wrongful and that, therefore, Avaya’s tortious 
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interference claim must fail.  That conclusion rested on two 
propositions: first, that Avaya had previously allowed TLI to 
provide maintenance, and, second, that “customers’ licensing 
agreements specifically allow[ed] for third-party service 
providers.”  (J.A. 226.)  Both those propositions are 
problematic in ways that undermine the District Court’s 
decision. 
 
As to the first point, the District Court was wrong to 
conclude that TLI was entitled to access ODMCs merely 
because it had been allowed to do so while it was an Avaya 
Business Partner.  Of course TLI was permitted access when 
it was a contractual partner of Avaya’s, but the District Court 
provided no rationale to explain why that access survived the 
termination of that relationship.  By close analogy, former 
employees in Lamorte were entitled to use their employer’s 
proprietary customer information while they were working 
for that employer, but they were not entitled to use that 
information when they left to become competitors.  770 A.2d 
at 1172.  Likewise, TLI was entitled to access ODMCs when 
it was an authorized Avaya Business Partner, but there is no 
reason it could expect that its access to proprietary software 
and logins would survive when it struck out on its own to 
compete directly against Avaya. 
 
As to the second point, we have already explained in 
detail why the District Court erred in concluding that Avaya 
customers were unambiguously entitled to give TLI remote 
access to perform maintenance.  Even if the District Court 
were correct, however, that would not immunize TLI from a 
tortious interference claim when it comes to stealing away 
customers who had service contracts with Avaya.  In Wear-
Ever Aluminum, Inc. v. Townecraft Industries, Inc., the 
49 
 
Chancery Division of the New Jersey Superior Court 
emphasized that, even though the plaintiff company’s 
contracts with its employees were terminable at will, that did 
not permit a third party to interfere with the employment 
relationship.  182 A.2d 387, 393 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1962).  Even if the contract in question permits an act 
eventually taken by a customer, “a stranger to the contract 
may not exercise his will in substitution for the will of either 
of the parties to the contract.”  Id.  Moreover, even if TLI 
could have lawfully obtained access to MSPs and ODMCs 
from Avaya’s customers, that did not insulate it from tort 
liability for the methods it actually used to access the 
maintenance commands.  If a homeowner gives a neighbor 
permission to borrow tools, the neighbor is not thereby 
insulated from a trespass suit if he chooses to break into the 
garage to get them.   
 
Having rejected the District Court’s assessment of 
those two threshold matters, we turn next to its application of 
a multifactor test for tortious interference from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979).28  Assuming for 
the moment that the Court was applying the right test – and 
                                              
28 The District Court cited Printing Mart, 563 A.2d at 
752, for the proposition that New Jersey courts have adopted 
the multi-factor test from the Restatement.  In fact, Printing 
Mart adopted § 766B, but subsequent case law from the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey suggests that § 767 is also 
persuasive.  See Nostrame v. Santiago, 61 A.3d 893, 901 (N.J. 
2013) (“In determining whether the conduct complained of is 
improper, the Restatement offers general guidance, 
identifying a variety of relevant considerations.” (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767)). 
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we think looking to the case law may have been more 
productive – the District Court nonetheless misstepped in its 
legal ruling.  Section 767 lists the following factors for 
consideration: 
 
(a) the nature of the actor’s conduct, 
(b) the actor’s motive, 
(c) the interests of the other with which the 
actor’s conduct interferes, 
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the 
actor, 
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom 
of action of the actor and the contractual 
interests of the other, 
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor’s 
conduct to the interference and 
(g) the relations between the parties. 
 
The factors in that test are laden with subjective value 
judgments that will rarely be answerable as a matter of law.  
Nonetheless, and in the face of the already-recounted 
unflattering evidence against TLI, the District Court 
concluded that “[e]very single factor strongly indicates that 
[TLI’s] conduct d[id] not rise to the level ... the law 
proscribes.”  (J.A. 227.)  We disagree. 
 
First, the District Court stated that TLI acted with 
proper competitive motive and interest.29  But, even assuming 
                                              
29 Although the District Court was not explicit in 
enumerating which factors of the Restatement’s seven-factor 
test it was considering, we infer from its argument that it here 
considered factors (a), (b), and (d) together – respectively, the 
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that were true, a pro-competitive motive or interest does not 
absolve misconduct that falls afoul of the first factor’s 
consideration of the nature of the conduct.  Again, “[w]hile 
competition may constitute justification, a defendant-
competitor claiming a business-related excuse must justify 
not only its motive and purpose but also the means used.”  
Ideal Dairy Farms, 659 A.2d at 933. 
 
Second, the Court considered the nature of the 
protected interest, and it observed – without further comment 
or citation to authority – that “the law does not protect as 
forcefully a firm’s economic interest in possible, future 
customers as it does interests in contracting parties.”  (J.A. 
228.)  Whether or not that is true, TLI was in fact interfering 
with Avaya’s relationships with then-existing maintenance 
customers.  There was nothing speculative, or 
underwhelming, about that economic interest. 
 
Third, in considering society’s interest, the District 
Court found that TLI’s conduct “brought greater competition 
to the market and challenged widespread and vexatious 
threats of litigation.”  (J.A. 228.)  We do not believe the 
District Court was in a position to weigh the relative social 
merits of TLI’s conduct with Avaya’s proprietary interests in 
its software and its legitimate business expectations with its 
maintenance customers.  That is exactly the kind of factual 
and ethical determination meant for the jury rather than the 
Court. 
 
                                                                                                     
nature of TLI’s conduct, its motive, and the interests it sought 
to advance. 
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Fourth, in considering the proximity of TLI’s conduct 
to the interference, the District Court emphasized that TLI’s 
“interference was far removed from their allegedly improper 
conduct” because it only accessed the ODMCs after the 
customer in question had left Avaya.  (J.A. 229.)  But the 
customers never would have left Avaya if TLI had not been 
able to promise ODMC access.  The allegedly tortious 
conduct that enabled that access was therefore the sine qua 
non of TLI’s business. 
 
Finally, in considering the relations of the parties, the 
District Court determined that that factor “counsels for a 
finding of lawful conduct, as a mere four months after it 
signed the modified Avaya One agreement, and not long after 
originally encouraging TLI to invest in its maintenance 
business, Avaya cancelled the contract, thereby jeopardizing 
[TLI’s] monetary investment and business model.”  (J.A. 229-
30.)  That TLI chose to compete against Avaya rather than 
accept the standard Business Partner arrangement – and 
therefore prompted Avaya to terminate their relationship – 
cannot insulate TLI’s allegedly tortious conduct.  Avaya’s 
supposed bad acts and predatory conduct may end up 
supporting TLI’s antitrust counterclaims, but the District 
Court provided no authority to suggest that those acts 
permitted TLI to engage in hacking or fraud in retaliation for 
its termination as a Business Partner. 
 
A straightforward application of New Jersey’s test for 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage 
leads, we believe, to the conclusion that Avaya presented 
sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could 
conclude that TLI tortiously interfered with Avaya’s 
prospective business advantage.  Avaya had a reasonable 
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expectation of ongoing business with its own customers, who 
are the targets of TLI’s sales efforts.  As to the “malicious 
interference” element, we hold that a jury could reasonably 
have concluded that TLI’s methods – including, as examples, 
its hacking, dishonest login requests, and use of proprietary 
information learned while an Avaya Business Partner – were 
fraudulent, dishonest, or otherwise contrary to the ethical 
standards of the industry.  TLI presented no evidence that its 
actions were consistent with industry norms, and we would be 
loath to hold that there was no jury question here, even if it 
had.  That leaves only the loss and causation element.  The 
evidence could support a conclusion that TLI’s interference 
resulted in Avaya losing direct maintenance contracts with 
customers.  Moreover, even if customers independently 
terminated their direct service contracts with Avaya, if they 
had turned to other authorized maintenance methods instead 
of using TLI – whether using a Business Partner or self-
maintaining – Avaya would still have profited because, as 
earlier noted, those methods also produced revenue for 
Avaya.  Avaya thus presented sufficient evidence from which 
a jury could conclude that Avaya suffered damages, given 
that any money earned by TLI must have come from Avaya’s 
pockets to at least some extent. 
 
In sum, the District Court improperly made inferences 
in favor of the moving party, TLI, as to both contract 
interpretation and tortious interference with prospective 
economic advantage, and it failed to recognize the sufficiency 
of the evidence Avaya had adduced.  If the jury had been 
allowed to draw its own inferences from the evidence, it may 
have agreed with the District Court that TLI’s conduct was 
somehow permitted by Avaya’s customer contracts.  But the 
jury may very well have determined that TLI’s actions were 
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not shielded by the customer contracts and were instead 
unethical, against the public interest, and ultimately tortious.  
We express no opinion on the correct answer in this dispute, 
holding only that the matter was for the jury to decide. 
 
4. Unfair Competition 
 
Next, we consider Avaya’s unfair competition claim.  
New Jersey law is not precise about what constitutes unfair 
competition.  But while “[t]he amorphous nature of unfair 
competition makes for an unevenly developed and difficult 
area of jurisprudence,” at heart it “seeks to espouse some 
baseline level of business fairness.”  Coast Cities Truck Sales, 
Inc. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Co., 912 F. Supp. 747, 786 
(D.N.J. 1995) (interpreting New Jersey law) (citations 
omitted).30  New Jersey courts have deliberately kept the 
standard of liability somewhat adaptable, so that it may fit 
changing circumstances: “the purpose of the law regarding 
unfair competition is to promote higher ethical standards in 
the business world.  Accordingly, the concept is deemed as 
flexible and elastic as the evolving standards of commercial 
morality demand.”  Ryan v. Carmona Bolen Home for 
Funerals, 775 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting N.J. 
                                              
30 Other business torts – including tortious interference 
– can themselves support an unfair competition claim.  Coast 
Cities, 912 F. Supp. at 786.  Our conclusion that the tortious 
interference claim should have proceeded to the jury is itself 
sufficient to overturn the judgment as a matter of law on the 
unfair competition claim.  Our analysis here focuses on those 
aspects of unfair competition that are distinct from tortious 
interference. 
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Optometric Ass’n v. Hillman-Kohan, 365 A.2d 956 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1976)). 
 
In New Jersey, unfair competition is commonly 
invoked for claims similar to misappropriation of trade 
secrets or commercial identity.  An unfair competition claim, 
however, protects more information than a traditional trade 
secret claim.  See Torsiello v. Strobeck, 955 F. Supp. 2d 300, 
314 (D.N.J. 2013) (“Under New Jersey law, to be judicially 
protected, misappropriated information need not rise to the 
level of the usual trade secret, and indeed, may otherwise be 
publicly available.” (quoting Platinum Mgmt., Inc. v. Dahms, 
666 A.2d 1028, 1038 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1995))).  For 
example, in the Lamorte case, the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey reinstated summary judgment against the plaintiff’s ex-
employees who took their former employer’s “client names, 
addresses, phone and fax numbers, file numbers, claim 
incident dates, claim contact information, and names of the 
injured persons.”  770 A.2d at 1162.  The court endorsed the 
statement “that an agent must not take ‘unfair advantage of 
his position in the use of information or things acquired by 
him because of his position as agent or because of the 
opportunities which his position affords.’”  Id. at 1167 
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 387 cmt. b 
(1958)).  The court emphasized that “the [client-specific] 
information was available to defendants for their use in 
servicing clients on behalf of Lamorte only,” and that 
“defendants also knew that Lamorte had an interest in 
protecting that information.”  Id. at 1167.  Collectively, those 
facts established that the “information taken by defendants 
was confidential and proprietary information belonging to 
plaintiff.”  Id. at 1168. 
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What constitutes misappropriation is somewhat vague.  
“It is not possible to formulate a comprehensive list of the 
conduct that constitutes ‘improper’ means of acquiring a trade 
secret.”  Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 cmt 
c. (1995).  Generally, however, “‘[i]mproper’ means ... 
include theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of 
communications, inducement of or knowing participation in a 
breach of confidence, and other means either wrongful in 
themselves or wrongful under the circumstances of the case.”  
Id. § 43.  Even a legitimate business purpose will not excuse 
otherwise tortious conduct if the means used are improper.  
See Lamorte, 770 A.2d at 1171.  As another court has put it,  
 
[t]he key to determining the misuse of the 
information is the relationship of the parties at 
the time of disclosure, and its intended use.  
This tort tends to arise where an ex-employee 
uses confidential information to assist a 
competitor.  A court may look to whether the 
information is public, whether it was provided 
in the course of employment for the sole 
purpose of servicing clients, how detailed the 
information is, and whether the party using the 
information is aware of the information holder’s 
interest in protecting the information ... .  
 
Torsiello, 955 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
 
For a plaintiff to establish damages, New Jersey law 
allows recovery under a disgorgement theory in cases of 
unfair competition.  See Castrol, Inc. v. Pennzoil Quaker 
State Co., 169 F. Supp. 2d 332, 345-46 (D.N.J. 2001) (ruling 
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that the plaintiff in that case was “entitled to disgorgement of 
[the defendant’s] profits” for its “claims under the New Jersey 
Common Law of Unfair Competition ... .”).31  Therefore, in 
place of proving specific damages, Avaya could properly seek 
disgorgement of TLI’s profits from any conduct the jury 
found tortious. 
 
We hold that Avaya presented sufficient evidence that 
a reasonable jury could have concluded that there was unfair 
competition under a misappropriation theory.  The District 
Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law was thus 
erroneous.  TLI gained access to proprietary information – 
namely ODMC login passwords – using hacking, the 
solicitation of disloyal former Avaya employees, and 
information learned during TLI’s own time as an Avaya 
Business Partner.  A jury could have determined that TLI’s 
methods of gaining Avaya’s proprietary information 
constituted misappropriation.  Likewise, Avaya could show 
damages under either a lost profit theory or a disgorgement 
theory.  Given that such a large proportion of TLI’s well-
accounted profits resulted from conduct that Avaya alleges 
was rooted in the misappropriation or proprietary 
information, the disgorgement theory may have been simple 
for the jury to apply to determine damages. 
 
5. Fraud 
                                              
31 See also Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
§ 45 (1995) (“One who is liable to another for an 
appropriation of the other’s trade secret ... is liable for the 
pecuniary loss to the other caused by the appropriation or for 
the actor’s own pecuniary gain resulting from the 
appropriation, whichever is greater ... .”). 
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We next consider Avaya’s common law fraud claim.  
Under New Jersey law, 
 
proof of common law fraud requires the 
satisfaction of five elements: [1] a material 
misrepresentation by the defendant of a 
presently existing fact or past fact; [2] 
knowledge or belief by the defendant of its 
falsity; [3] an intent that the plaintiff rely on the 
statement; [4] reasonable reliance by the 
plaintiff; [5] and resulting damages to the 
plaintiff. 
 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 892 A.2d 1240, 1247 (N.J. 
2006).  A jury must find fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence, a standard which demands “evidence so clear, 
direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the factfinder 
to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the 
precise facts in issue.”  N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. 
I.S., 996 A.2d 986, 1000 (N.J. 2010) (quoting In re Seaman, 
627 A.2d 106, 100 (N.J. 1993)).Proof of damages can be 
supported by a jury inference that a defendant’s actions 
“reduced the plaintiff’s profits, although by an uncertain 
amount.”  Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello, 
477 A.2d 1224, 1233 (N.J. 1984). 
 
Based on the trial record, there was ample evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could have found for Avaya on 
the fraud claim.  The evidence for the first element – 
fraudulent conduct – is straightforward.  TLI had its 
customers fill out forms requesting login permissions but 
instructed those customers to leave the “Business Partner” 
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component of the form blank, to be filled in later by TLI.  TLI 
would then insert the name of an authorized Business Partner 
so that Avaya would provide the requested login information.  
TLI therefore willfully misrepresented who was making the 
request for the login credentials and acknowledged the 
materiality of that misrepresentation by confirming that it did 
not want Avaya to find out what they were doing, because 
Avaya would otherwise not provide the logins.   
 
The evidence also satisfies the second element, 
knowledge, in that it supports a conclusion that TLI knew it 
was operating under false pretenses.  The form at issue, by its 
very language, is a request from a customer to Avaya for 
delivery of information to a specifically named Business 
Partner.  The form provided that the login Avaya furnished 
would allow “the Business Partner listed above ... to perform 
additions, changes, moves and/or upgrades.”  (J.A. 5313.)  
Yet TLI submitted the form knowing full well that the 
“Business Partner listed above” would not be performing 
those tasks, because TLI would be. 
 
As to the third element, the reasonableness of relying 
on the representation, TLI filled out the form with the name 
and information of an existing, authorized Business Partner.  
A jury could find that Avaya acted reasonably by providing 
access information when it believed such access was being 
delivered to a provider with whom it had an existing contract. 
 
 The final element, damages, is what most concerned 
the District Court.  As established above, however, Avaya 
presented strong evidence – sufficient for the clear and 
convincing standard – that every dollar made by TLI in its 
maintenance of Avaya products was necessarily to some 
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degree at Avaya’s expense.  A jury could have reasonably 
concluded that each time TLI used a fraudulently obtained 
login to win or keep a maintenance contract, that cost Avaya 
profit.  As the Supreme Court of New Jersey confirmed in 
Nappe, such an inference is enough to sustain a finding of 
damages, even where the exact amount may be uncertain.  
477 A.2d at 1233. 
 
 Avaya thus presented sufficient evidence to send the 
fraud claim to the jury, based on TLI’s deceptive login 
requests. 
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6. Breach of Contract 
 
Finally, we turn to Avaya’s breach of contract claims 
against TLI.  As developed at trial, Avaya contended that TLI 
breached two contracts: the 1998 dealer agreement between 
Lucent and TLI, and the 2003 Avaya One agreement that was 
effective until TLI’s participation as a Business Partner was 
terminated.32  In both cases, the District Court did not contest 
the existence of the contract or damages, but instead granted 
judgment as a matter of law on the ground that “Avaya ha[d] 
failed to introduce evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find that TLI breached either of the contracts.”  (J.A. 
210.)  Once again, there is not a sound basis for that holding. 
 
a. 1998 Dealer Agreement 
 
The 1998 contract’s choice of law provision provides 
that it is governed by Delaware law.  In Delaware, the 
elements of a breach of contract claim are: “[1] the existence 
of the contract, whether express or implied; [2] the breach of 
an obligation imposed by that contract; and [3] the resultant 
damage to the plaintiff.”  VLIW Tech., LLC v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 840 A.2d 606, 612 (Del. 2003). 
 
                                              
32 Whereas the customer contracts referenced above in 
Part II.A.2 were for PBX systems, the dealer agreements 
between Avaya and TLI are worded broadly enough to reach 
both the PBX and PDS markets.  Insofar as Avaya’s breach of 
contract allegations rely primarily on improper access to 
ODMCs and MSPs, however, the breach of contract claim is 
principally focused on the larger PBX market. 
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The signature page of the 1998 agreement evidences a 
contract between Lucent (Avaya’s predecessor) and TLI 
(referred to in the contract as the “Dealer”), satisfying the first 
element of the cause of action.  Section 2.8 of the 1998 
agreement provides, in part, as follows: 
 
Dealer may not market or sell Lucent Products 
to any Lucent BCS Global Account, or … the 
United States Government, and will use its best 
efforts to ensure that Dealer does not market to 
present direct customers of Lucent who are 
under warranty or with existing maintenance 
contracts for Lucent products or to any entity 
that is considering a proposal from Lucent for 
products or maintenance services, except that 
Dealer may respond to a request for competitive 
bids, proposals, or quotations even if Lucent is 
also responding. 
(J.A. 5905 (emphases added).) 
 
Avaya claims that TLI breached that “best efforts” 
clause by marketing and selling maintenance services to 
existing Lucent/Avaya customers.  At trial, Douglas Graham 
admitted that TLI “marketed … to existing Avaya 
maintenance customers” in 2001, while the firm “was 
operating under the terms of the 1998 Lucent dealer 
agreement.”  (J.A. 2704.)  He also acknowledged a particular 
client to whom TLI had “marketed ... maintenance to replace 
existing Avaya maintenance.”  (J.A. 2705.) 
 
In spite of what is arguably a clear violation of § 2.8 of 
the agreement, the District Court concluded that TLI’s 
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conduct “does not constitute a breach” because the Court 
interpreted § 2.8 to prohibit only the marketing of “Lucent 
Products,” a defined term that did not include maintenance.  
(J.A. 212.)  That, however, is an overly cramped 
interpretation of the provision.  Although a jury could perhaps 
import the “Lucent Products” language into the “best efforts” 
clause, that clause could just as easily support an 
interpretation that generally bars the marketing of 
maintenance to Lucent/Avaya customers.  Indeed, the best 
efforts clause specifically prohibits marketing to 
Lucent/Avaya customers “with existing maintenance 
contracts ... or to any entity that is considering a proposal 
from Lucent for … maintenance services,” which strongly 
suggests that maintenance was part of the prohibition.  (J.A. 
5905.)  The District Court therefore erred in assuming that 
“no reasonable jury” could have found a breach of § 2.8.  
(J.A. 213.) 
 
As to the final element, damages, we conclude that the 
same analysis for the earlier causes of action would have 
supported a jury finding that any profit that TLI gained by its 
breach of contract must have come, at least in part, at Avaya’s 
expense.  Therefore, we conclude that a jury could reasonably 
have found all three elements of a breach of contract, and 
judgment as a matter of law was not proper. 
 
b. 2003 Avaya One Agreement 
 
The choice of law clause in the Avaya One agreement, 
§ 18.1, provides that New York law governs.  Under New 
York law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are 
similar to Delaware’s: “[1] the existence of a contract, [2] the 
plaintiff’s performance pursuant to the contract, [3] the 
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defendant’s breach of his or her contractual obligations, and 
[4] damages resulting from the breach.”  Neckles Builders, 
Inc. v. Turner, 986 N.Y.S. 2d 494, 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2014). 
 
The signature page of the Avaya One agreement 
evidences a contract between Avaya and TLI, satisfying the 
first element.  Section 7.3 of the Avaya One agreement 
provides, in part, as follows: 
 
[TLI] agrees not to reverse engineer, decompile 
or disassemble software furnished to it in object 
code form or permit any third party to do so.  
For any software included as part of the 
Licensed Materials which inherently includes 
the capability of being remotely enabled, [TLI] 
expressly agrees that it shall not enable, or 
permit or assist any third party to enable, such 
features or capabilities without Avaya’s express 
written permission.33 
 
(J.A. 6953.)  That obligation was clearly intended to survive 
the termination of the Avaya One agreement.34  Both an 
                                              
33 As an Avaya executive testified at trial, the purpose 
of that provision was “to protect [Avaya’s] software assets 
going forward if there is information that a Business Partner 
gets, [and] also to make sure that nothing gets turned on 
subsequent[ to] termination.”  (J.A. 2116.) 
 
34 Section 17.6 of the agreement provided that “the 
termination of the Agreement shall not prejudice or otherwise 
affect ... any ... obligations of the parties, such as those arising 
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Avaya executive and a systems engineer testified that MSPs 
and the DADMIN logins were capable of being remotely 
enabled. 
 
 The agreement also included, at § 4.1, a general 
morality clause that bound TLI for the duration of the 
agreement: 
 
[TLI] shall: (a) conduct its business in a manner 
that reflects favorably on the Products and on 
the good name, goodwill and reputation of 
Avaya; (b) avoid deception, misleading or 
unethical practices; and (c) use best efforts to 
promote, market, and further the interest of 
Avaya, its name and Products. 
(J.A. 6951 (emphases added).) 
 
Although Avaya’s performance – the second element 
of a breach of contract claim – was not part of the District 
Court’s analysis, the record provides sufficient evidence for a 
jury to conclude that Avaya did perform.  TLI was operating 
as a Business Partner under the Avaya One agreement from 
its execution until the business relationship between the 
parties was terminated.  Douglas Graham acknowledged that 
the relationship was “mutually beneficial” and that, “[a]s an 
Avaya Business Partner ... TLI was authorized by Avaya to 
resell certain Avaya products and services.”  (J.A. 2699.)  
                                                                                                     
under [Section 7], which by their nature continue beyond 
termination of the Agreement and which shall survive such 
termination.”  (J.A. 6959.) 
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Indeed, Avaya equipment was “by far [the] leading 
manufacturer product that [TLI] sold.”  (J.A. 2700.) 
 
The District Court’s analysis focused on the third 
element – the actual breach of a contractual obligation.  
Avaya’s claim for breach of § 7.3 is straightforward.  Insofar 
as MSPs and DADMINs were “licensed Materials which 
inherently include[d] the capability of being remotely 
enabled,” a jury could find that TLI breached its contractual 
obligations when it “enable[d] ... or assist[ed] any third party 
to enable, such features or capabilities without Avaya’s 
express written permission.”  (J.A. 6953.)  Even though the 
District Court acknowledged that the meaning of those terms 
was “less than perfectly clear,” it nonetheless concluded that 
the term “features and capabilities” unambiguously excluded 
MSPs and DADMIN logins.  (J.A. 218-19.)  Yet the 
activation of MSPs and use of DADMIN logins allowed 
customers to perform remote maintenance, for which 
customers were willing to pay additional licensing fees, 
suggesting that the customers considered them to be features 
or capabilities.  Even if a reasonable jury could have agreed 
with the District Court’s reading of the contract, there was at 
least sufficient ambiguity in the Avaya One agreement that 
the jury could have seen it the other way and agreed with 
Avaya that MSPs and DADMIN logins are “features and 
capabilities,” the unauthorized activation of which by TLI 
amounted to a breach of contractual obligations.   
 
As to the morality clause in § 4.1, Avaya contended 
that TLI breached its obligations when it began its allegedly 
unethical business practices during the term of the contract, in 
preparation for soliciting maintenance customers away from 
Avaya.  Those activities included hacking logins and enlisting 
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Business Partners to obtain ODMC access.  As early as May 
2003, while still bound by the Avaya One agreement, TLI 
solicited Creswick to “pull ... password[s].”  (J.A. 2281.)  In 
September, during the contract term, TLI began to seek a 
“discreet Avaya Business Partner ... [to] submit DADMIN 
request forms on our behalf.”  (J.A. 5813.)  A reasonable jury 
could have concluded that, by engaging Creswick and 
recruiting Business Partners to submit deceptive DADMIN 
login request forms, TLI was violating its contractual 
obligations to “avoid deception [and] misleading or unethical 
practices” and to “use best efforts to promote, market, and 
further the interest of Avaya.” (J.A. 6951.) 
 
Analysis of damages – the final element of the cause 
of action – was not central to the District Court’s grant of 
judgment as a matter of law.  However, the analysis for 
damages is as straightforward as for the tort claims, because 
PBX and PDS maintenance business gained by TLI as a result 
of its breach must have come, to some extent, at Avaya’s 
expense. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the 
District Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law was 
erroneous for the four affirmative common law claims that 
Avaya addresses in this appeal.35  We will therefore vacate 
                                              
35 Although our dissenting colleague’s “assessment of 
Avaya’s case-in-chief is the same as the District Court’s” 
(Dissenting Op. at 3-4), he has sufficient “doubt about the 
propriety of the District Court’s decision” that he focuses his 
opinion on other issues (id. at 4).  We therefore let our 
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the District Court’s judgment and remand for further 
proceedings on those four claims.  That does not, however, 
end our inquiry.  Given the District Court’s instruction to the 
jury that all of TLI’s conduct was lawful, we must also 
consider whether the several errors associated with the 
District Court’s handling of the common law claims also 
infected the remainder of the trial. 
 
B. Prejudice on the Antitrust Verdict 
 
Avaya, of course, argues that the error did spill over 
into the antitrust verdict.  It presents three bases for 
concluding that the judgment as a matter of law prejudiced 
the jury’s consideration of the antitrust counterclaims: first, it 
undermined Avaya’s defense that its responses to TLI’s 
conduct were reasonable and pro-competitive; second, it lent 
false credence to TLI’s assertion that Avaya knew there was 
no truth to its letters (the so-called “FUD” letters described 
above) telling customers that using ISPs would be unlawful; 
and third, it led the District Court to wrongly restrict Avaya’s 
cross-examinations of TLI witnesses.  We agree that those 
problems, all resulting from the erroneous grant of judgment 
as a matter of law, did indeed likely affect the antitrust 
verdict. 
 
1. General Prejudice to Avaya’s  
 Antitrust Defense 
 
All of the antitrust counterclaims against Avaya were 
presented under the “rule of reason,” which gives effect to the 
                                                                                                     
analysis of the District Court’s error speak for itself as a 
response to that portion of the Dissent. 
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Supreme Court’s instruction that the Sherman Act “only 
means to declare illegal any [restraint] which is in 
unreasonable restraint of trade.”  United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 327 (1897) (emphasis 
added).  “Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive 
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition.”  Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).  Therefore, limitations on 
Avaya’s ability to explain the reasonableness of its actions 
had the potential to harm its defense. 
 
For the Sherman Act § 2 monopolization claims, for 
example, TLI had to establish that Avaya’s allegedly 
predatory conduct was performed with monopolistic intent.  
“To prevail on an attempted monopolization claim under § 2 
of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
(1) engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) 
specific intent to monopolize and with (3) a dangerous 
probability of achieving monopoly power.”  Queen City 
Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 442 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “Liability turns ... on whether valid business 
reasons can explain [a defendant’s] actions.”  Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 483 (1992) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  As the District Court 
instructed the jury, “acts or practices that result in the 
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power must 
represent something more than the conduct of business that is 
part of the normal competitive process” and must be actions 
that are “taken for no legitimate business reasons.”  (J.A. 
621.)   Insofar as Avaya was limited in explaining why its 
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actions were not predatory or lacked a monopolistic intent, 
those limitations would of course harm its defense.36   
 
The District Court’s instructions in light of its 
erroneous Rule 50 decision on the common law claims may 
well have affected the jury’s assessment of the reasonableness 
and purpose of Avaya’s actions.  The jury was prevented 
from deciding the antitrust claims and the common law 
claims in concert and from evaluating whether TLI’s 
allegedly tortious conduct provided a legitimate business 
justification for the things Avaya’s did.  Specifically, the 
Court instructed the jury that 
 
Avaya’s claim[s] against TLI[] ... have been 
resolved and are no longer before you.  ...   
 
In Avaya’s direct claims against all the 
defendants, Avaya asserted that [TLI’s] use of 
                                              
36 Moreover, as we explain in more detail below, under 
the specific theory of antitrust liability pressed by TLI, if 
Avaya’s sales contracts had established that using 
independent service providers was prohibited, then any 
remedy to infirmities in that arrangement would lie “in 
contract, not under the antitrust laws.”  Queen City Pizza, 124 
F.3d at 441.  Therefore, to the extent that Avaya’s 
interpretation of its customer contracts was correct, that 
would have added a very potent weapon to Avaya’s arsenal to 
combat the specific theory of antitrust liability argued by TLI.  
But Avaya was precluded from making that argument 
because the District Court erroneously adopted a definitive 
construction of those contracts, as a matter of law, in service 
of its Rule 50 decision. 
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and access to the maintenance software 
embedded in the Avaya PBXs and PDSs, such 
as the on-demand maintenance commands, was, 
for a variety of reasons, unlawful.  I now 
instruct you that [TLI’s] use of and access to 
such maintenance software may not be 
considered by you as unlawful when deciding 
[TLI’s] claims against Avaya asserted in the 
counterclaim.  To the extent Avaya has alleged 
that TLI[] engaged in illegal or unlawful 
conduct, in connection with its business 
operations, such allegations should be 
disregarded. 
 
(J.A. 4739 (emphasis added).) 
 
 Not only did the District Court so instruct the jury, but 
TLI itself repeatedly emphasized that instruction in its closing 
argument in order to undercut Avaya’s defense that there was 
a reasonable business justification for its actions.  Consider 
this passage from TLI’s summation: 
 
When TLI started to compete with Avaya, it 
had the right to do so; and, yes, [the District 
Court] will instruct you tomorrow, you should 
not consider TLI’s ... use of and access to the 
maintenance software that’s embedded in these 
Avaya PBX systems and dialers, do not 
consider it in any way unlawful.  And this is 
critically important for you to understand. You 
are not to consider TLI’s actions in that regard 
unlawful. 
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(J.A. 4732.)37 
 
 The District Court’s erroneous instruction, combined 
with TLI’s repeated hammering of the point, highlights how 
important the lawfulness or unlawfulness of TLI’s actions 
could have been to the jury’s deliberations.  Avaya’s entire 
affirmative case alleged that TLI’s conduct was tortious and 
in breach of contractual obligations.  If true, Avaya’s 
defensive response could be seen as substantially more 
reasonable, and its intentions substantially less predatory.  By 
instructing the jury that it could not consider TLI’s conduct to 
be unlawful – an instruction premised on the flawed grant of 
judgment as a matter of law – the District Court improperly 
prevented the jury from weighing Avaya’s defenses in light of 
the rule of reason standard for both the § 1 and § 2 Sherman 
Act claims.38 
                                              
37 At least twice more, TLI strongly emphasized the 
importance of the District Court’s jury instructions.  For 
instance, it told the jury that “[w]hen TLI started to compete 
with Avaya, it had every right to do so. TLI’s use and access 
to maintenance software that’s embedded in these systems, 
you should not consider to be unlawful. You will hear that 
instruction from the judge tomorrow.”  (J.A. 4733.)  Later, it 
reminded the jury: “Again, you will be instructed by the 
Court tomorrow, that you are not to consider TLI’s access to 
or use of the maintenance software, including MSPs and 
ODMs, called ODMCs and maintenance software 
permissions, as in any way unlawful use of that maintenance 
software.”  (J.A. 4734.) 
 
38 As we read the Dissent, its objection to our 
conclusion comes down to its premise that “Avaya had ample 
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opportunity to present the jury with legitimate and 
procompetitive defenses for its actions.”  (Dissenting Op. at 
10.)  To be sure, Avaya mounted a vigorous defense 
notwithstanding the limitations it faced as a result of the Rule 
50 ruling, but we lack the Dissent’s confidence that it is 
“highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of 
the case.”  Glass v. Phila. Elec. Co., 34 F.3d 188, 191 (3d Cir. 
1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  A jury may 
well have evaluated Avaya’s conduct differently if Avaya 
were simply enforcing its contractual rights or combating 
tortious activity, as TLI itself recognized by its repeated 
emphasis in its summation that its actions could not be 
considered unlawful.  The Dissent betrays the importance of 
the lawfulness determination when it says that Avaya’s 
“defenses did not depend on whether TLI’s conduct was so 
egregious as to be against the law.”  (Id.)  The special 
egregiousness of unlawful conduct is precisely the argument 
that Avaya wanted to make – and was deprived from making 
– to the jury. 
This is also where the Dissent’s “David and Goliath” 
analogy breaks down.  Avaya was certainly the bigger 
competitor, but TLI was no plucky little company armed only 
with the business equivalent of a sling and a few stones.  It 
was a sophisticated and aggressive company, which, at least 
according to Avaya and a great deal of the evidence at trial, 
was prepared to, and did, engage in what even the Dissent 
acknowledges were “deceitful and/or unethical” business 
methods.  (Id. at 2.)  Since those methods were such that the 
jury could have found them unlawful, the Rule 50 error was 
not harmless. 
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2. “Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt”  
 Letters 
 
Beyond the general infection of the jury’s 
consideration of the reasonableness of Avaya’s actions, the 
District Court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law also 
undercut a specific portion of Avaya’s antitrust defense. 
 
Among the evidence put forward by TLI to prove 
predatory conduct were the FUD letters.  Those letters told 
customers that MSPs “are not available to customers of 
Unauthorized Service Providers,” that “Unauthorized 
Maintenance Service Providers do not have rights to receive 
[MSP] benefits, nor do they have rights to use Avaya logins,” 
and that “[u]se of MSPs, or any Avaya Login ... without a 
license from Avaya, is an infringement of Avaya’s 
intellectual property rights.”  (J.A. 7303-04.) 
 
Whether those letters could constitute monopolistic 
conduct turned on whether they were true.  As the District 
Court instructed the jury, “the law does not allow [TLI’s] 
injury to be based on ... Avaya’s dissemination of truthful 
statements.”  (J.A. 621.)  The jury’s assessment of the letters’ 
truthfulness was surely influenced by the District Court’s 
instruction that TLI’s “use of and access to such maintenance 
software may not be considered by you as unlawful” and that 
“[t]o the extent Avaya has alleged that TLI[] engaged in 
illegal or unlawful conduct, in connection with its business 
operations, such allegations should be disregarded.”  (J.A. 
615.) 
 
That instruction all but told the jury that the letters 
were false in their allegation that TLI’s access was unlawful.  
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TLI’s trial counsel then connected those closely adjacent dots 
when he took advantage of the instruction to argue to the jury 
that Avaya’s FUD letters were untruthful and therefore 
monopolistic: 
 
Even though it acknowledged that it had no 
legal basis to do so,[39] Avaya sent FUD letters 
to TLI’s customers ... . 
 
As the Court will instruct you tomorrow, you 
are not to consider ... TLI’s access to the 
maintenance commands or the maintenance 
software as unlawful, but Avaya’s FUD 
campaign simply did not convey truthful 
information. 
 
(J.A. 4736.)40  
                                              
39 We have been shown nothing in the record 
suggesting that Avaya acknowledged that it had “no legal 
basis” to send the so-called FUD letters.  To the contrary, 
Avaya’s entire affirmative case relied in large part on a belief 
that TLI’s unauthorized provision of maintenance services did 
lead customers to breach their contracts with Avaya.  On 
appeal, Avaya continues to argue that the FUD letters were 
truthful.   
 
40 The Dissent contends that “[e]ven if the jury had not 
been instructed that unauthorized access to Avaya software 
was not illegal, it is unlikely that it would have reached a 
different verdict.”  (Dissenting Op. at 13.)  The Dissent says 
that Avaya seemed to concede that the FUD letters included 
some “over-the-top” prose (id.), but be that as it may, the 
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3. Interference with Defense and Cross-
 Examination 
 
Avaya also contends that the District Court’s grant of 
judgment as a matter of law hindered its ability to present 
evidence in its defense against the antitrust claims.  It points 
to two examples in particular. 
 
First, during Avaya’s cross-examination of TLI’s 
CEO, Avaya’s counsel asked about how TLI got access to 
Avaya brand PBX systems.  At a sidebar, the District Court 
told counsel that, “[i]f you’re trying to tell the jury they’re 
illegal, I have a problem with that.”  (J.A. 4440.)  The Court 
did allow the line of questions but under the restriction that 
counsel could not imply that TLI’s actions were unlawful. 
 
Second, when Avaya was examining its own 
economics expert, it presented evidence that restrictions it 
placed on its Business Partners actually ended up “clearing 
the field” in a way that advantaged TLI competitively.41  
                                                                                                     
degree to which those letters were legitimate surely depended 
on the truth of the legal assertions in them.  If Avaya was 
correct in its assertions that unauthorized access was unlawful 
– a question taken away from the jury by virtue of the Rule 50 
decision – then the letters arguably contain defensible 
statements of law.  That could make a world of difference to a 
jury in evaluating the truthfulness and competitive legitimacy 
of the letters. 
 
41 The basis for the field-clearing argument was that 
because Avaya restricted its Business Partners from 
competing with it for maintenance business, when TLI sought 
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Before the Rule 50 decision, the expert was planning to 
include analysis predicated on the illegality of TLI’s conduct, 
but – after the judgment as a matter of law – the District 
Court reminded counsel in a sidebar to “[s]tay away from 
trying to ... contradict anything I’ve already decided,” in 
reference to the Rule 50 decision.  (J.A. 4587.) 
 
Those specific examples speak to a broader point.  
They highlight that, if Avaya had been able to argue that 
TLI’s conduct was unlawful, that argument would likely have 
been a key and repeated part of its defense to the antitrust 
claims.  Each argument by TLI’s counsel to the contrary 
could have been met with a forceful response.  Avaya’s claim 
that it was “hamstrung in its ability to justify its supposedly 
anticompetitive conduct” is therefore a fair and accurate one.  
(Third Step Br. at 19.)42 
                                                                                                     
to lure customers from Avaya, it did not have to compete with 
any of those Business Partners, who were precluded from 
seeking that business.  In that way, the expert opined, TLI 
benefited from much of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct 
over which it filed suit because that conduct restricted TLI’s 
competition as much as it did Avaya’s. 
 
42 The Dissent suggests that any limitations placed on 
Avaya’s defense as a result of the Rule 50 ruling were merely 
“rhetorical,” and that being able to argue the illegality of 
TLI’s conduct “would not have changed the substance of 
Avaya’s procompetitive-justification argument.”  (Dissenting 
Op. at 12.)  We disagree.  It is one thing to explain to a jury 
that sharp-elbowed tactics were taken to retaliate against 
aggressive but completely lawful activities of a competitor.  It 
is altogether different to be able to argue that the restraints of 
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4. Harmless Error Analysis 
 
Having concluded that the judgment as a matter of law 
on Avaya’s common law claims was an error, and that that 
error likely affected the jury’s consideration of the antitrust 
claims, we must now consider whether that effect was 
harmless.  “An error will be deemed harmless only if it is 
highly probable that the error did not affect the outcome of 
the case,” and, in that same vein, an error cannot be said to be 
harmless unless there is a high probability “that the result 
would have been the same had the jury been correctly 
instructed.”  Hill v. Reederei F. Laeisz G.M.B.H., Rostock, 
435 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We have held, when interpreting this “highly 
probable” standard, that an error is not harmless if it could 
have “reasonably ... affected the outcome of the trial,” id. at 
411, or if the jury “quite possibly” relied on an erroneous 
instruction, see Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 
228 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
 In this case, we cannot say that it was “highly 
probable” that the District Court’s erroneous Rule 50 decision 
and resulting erroneous jury instruction about the lawfulness 
of TLI’s conduct did not affect the outcome of the antitrust 
claims.43  On the contrary: we think it probable that they did 
                                                                                                     
trade at issue were necessary to enforce Avaya’s contractual 
rights and to deter fraudulent and tortious interference with 
Avaya’s legitimate business interests. 
 
43 The Dissent would not even reach the question of 
whether the District Court’s erroneous Rule 50 order infected 
the antitrust verdict, on the ground that Avaya forfeited any 
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affect the outcome.  The judgment as a matter of law, the 
concordant limitations on Avaya’s antitrust defense, and the 
ultimate jury instruction about lawfulness all seriously 
hampered Avaya’s ability to argue that its conduct was a 
                                                                                                     
argument of spill-over prejudice.  That position seems to us to 
result from the Dissent’s separate (and, in our estimation, 
incorrect) view that any prejudicial effect on the jury’s 
consideration of the antitrust counterclaims was tangential 
and minor.  We agree with our dissenting colleague that, “[i]f 
a claim of error is unaccompanied by developed argument, it 
is forfeited.”  (Dissenting Op. at 6 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted).)  In this case, however, the claim of 
error – that the District Court’s Rule 50 decision was 
improper – was indisputably fully briefed and argued.  
Avaya’s position that the erroneous Rule 50 ruling tainted the 
antitrust verdict was made as a request for a particular form of 
relief to correct that error.  The request was brief but the 
brevity is unsurprising, given how inextricably linked 
Avaya’s rule of reason antitrust defense was to its claims that 
TLI’s actions were unlawful.  Avaya could reasonably have 
expected TLI’s answer simply to contest Avaya’s claim of 
error as to the Rule 50 ruling, as TLI in fact did contest at 
length.  As it happened, however, TLI also raised a separate 
argument, as an alternative basis to affirm, that any error was 
harmless as to the antitrust verdict.  Avaya then provided a 
rebuttal to that assertion of harmlessness with exactly the kind 
of responsive argumentation we would expect in a reply brief.  
Cf. Becker v. ARCO Chem. Co., 207 F.3d 176, 205 (3d Cir. 
2000) (considering and rejecting a harmless error argument 
raised for the first time by the appellee at oral argument and 
only then countered by the appellant). 
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justifiable and reasonable response to TLI’s underhanded 
methods of acquiring Avaya’s proprietary business 
information.  That TLI used the District Court’s errors to 
pound home its own case only compounded the problem and 
further undermines our confidence in the verdict.  Because 
the errors “quite possibly” affected the judgment, we must 
vacate it.  Hirst, 544 F.3d at 228.44 
 
C. Antitrust Issues 
 
Avaya does not simply seek vacatur, however.  It 
argues that we should reverse the judgment and hold that it is 
entitled to judgment on the antitrust counterclaims because 
TLI adduced insufficient evidence to support them.  We begin 
our analysis of that argument by reviewing how the antitrust 
laws treat product tying.  We then turn to Avaya’s claim-
specific contentions and conclude that the PBX attempted 
monopolization counterclaim is legally invalid for PBXs sold 
after 2008 and that the PDS tying counterclaim must fail as a 
matter of law. 
 
1. Tying in Antitrust Law 
 
TLI’s antitrust counterclaims against Avaya are based 
on an allegedly unlawful use of tying to restrain and 
monopolize the market for PBX and PDS maintenance 
services.  “[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an 
agreement by a party to sell one product [or service] but only 
                                              
44 The parties also dispute the propriety of the 
injunctive relief ordered by the District Court.  Because we 
will vacate the verdict and judgment of liability, we must also 
vacate the resulting injunction. 
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on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or 
tied) product [or service], or at least agrees that he will not 
purchase that product [or service] from any other supplier.”  
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 
(1958).  For a pair of products or services to be distinct, and 
therefore capable of being tied together, “there must be 
sufficient consumer demand so that it is efficient for a firm to 
provide [them] separately.”  Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462.  Tying 
can support a Sherman Act claim either under § 1, as an 
unlawful restraint on trade, or under § 2, as an unlawful act of 
monopolization or attempted monopolization. See Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Fundamentals of Antitrust 
Law (“Fundamentals”) § 17.01, at 17-13 (4th ed. Supp. 
2015); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2.45  Under the antitrust 
theories presented by TLI, Avaya unlawfully tied its PBX and 
PDS systems to maintenance services by conditioning access 
to equipment and software on the purchase of such services 
from Avaya or its Business Partners. 
 
Not all ties are illegal, however.  To declare otherwise 
would risk making practically every product the subject of an 
antitrust suit, because, in theory at least, most any product can 
be deconstructed into component parts that could be sold 
separately.  For that reason, “[i]t is clear ... that every refusal 
to sell two products separately cannot be said to restrain 
                                              
45 TLI secured verdicts against Avaya under both §§ 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act.  Section 1 declares illegal “[e]very 
contract, combination ..., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 1.  Section 2 makes unlawful any 
act to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire ... to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce.”  
15 U.S.C. § 2. 
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competition.”  Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2, 11 (1984) partially abrogated on other grounds by Ill. 
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 544 U.S. 28 (2006).  
Instead, 
 
the essential characteristic of an invalid tying 
arrangement lies in the seller’s exploitation of 
its control over the tying product to force the 
buyer into the purchase of a tied product that 
the buyer either did not want at all, or might 
have preferred to purchase elsewhere on 
different terms. When such “forcing” is present, 
competition on the merits in the market for the 
tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is 
violated. 
 
Id. at 12.  Therefore, “[w]hen ... the seller does not have ... the 
kind of market power that enables him to force customers to 
purchase a second, unwanted product in order to obtain the 
tying product, an antitrust violation can be established only 
by evidence of an unreasonable restraint on competition in the 
relevant market.”  Id. at 17-18. 
 
 In this case, nobody contends that the primary market 
for PBX and PDS systems is anything other than competitive, 
or that Avaya’s main competitors in that market – large firms 
such as Cisco, Siemens, and Microsoft – cannot use prices to 
discipline Avaya in that primary market.  As to the primary 
market, then, TLI’s position is not that Avaya’s “share of the 
market is high” or that it “offers a unique product that 
competitors are not able to offer.”  Id. at 17.  Rather, TLI has 
proceeded under a specialized theory of tying developed in a 
Supreme Court case called Eastman Kodak Company v. 
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Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).  Review 
of the Kodak opinion and our Court’s elaboration of its 
principles is essential, then, because TLI’s counterclaims rise 
or fall based on whether they comport with a Kodak theory of 
antitrust liability. 
 
a. The Kodak Theory of Antitrust 
 Tying Liability 
 
 Kodak presented the Supreme Court with a situation 
similar to the one before us, consisting of a primary market 
for complex durable goods and an aftermarket for 
maintenance service.  Kodak sold photocopier equipment, as 
well as maintenance service and replacement parts.  Id. at 
455.  The parts were of proprietary design and were not 
interchangeable with other manufacturers’ parts.  Id. at 456-
57.  Kodak sold both parts and service, using different 
contract arrangements to charge different prices to different 
customers.  Id. at 457.  When Kodak attempted to prevent the 
sale of its parts to independent maintenance service providers 
– thereby restricting their ability to service Kodak machines – 
a group of those independent providers filed suit, alleging 
unlawful tying of parts and service in violation of §§ 1 and 2 
of the Sherman Act.  Id. at 458-59. 
 
 On ultimate appeal from the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for Kodak, the Supreme Court ruled that 
the plaintiffs had put forward a strong enough case to proceed 
to trial.  The Court accepted Kodak’s argument that the 
primary equipment market was competitive, id. at 465 n.10, 
but it nonetheless ruled that the plaintiffs could proceed under 
a § 1 tying theory of antitrust liability.  It refused to endorse 
Kodak’s assertion that competition in the primary market 
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would necessarily discipline the maintenance aftermarket, 
preferring not to adopt “[l]egal presumptions that rest on 
formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities.”  
Id. at 466.  Instead, the Court insisted on a context-specific 
factual analysis of whether “the equipment market does 
discipline the aftermarkets so that [both] are priced 
competitively overall, or that any anti-competitive effects of 
Kodak’s behavior are outweighed by its competitive effects.”  
Id. at 486.  “The fact that the equipment market imposes a 
restraint on prices in the aftermarkets” does not, on its own, 
“disprove[] the existence of power in those markets.”  Id. at 
471 (citation omitted). 
 
 In explaining how a seller facing a competitive 
primary equipment market could nonetheless exercise market 
power in the parts and maintenance aftermarkets, the Court 
expounded a theory whereby high information and switching 
costs would allow the seller to exploit customers who had 
already purchased the equipment and were then “locked in” to 
the aftermarkets.  Id. at 476.  It explained that “[l]ifecycle 
pricing of complex, durable equipment is difficult and 
costly,” and that the information needed for such lifecycle 
pricing “is difficult – some of it impossible – to acquire at the 
time of purchase.”  Id. at 473.  Because “[a]cquiring the 
information is expensive[, i]f the costs of service are small 
relative to the equipment price, ... [consumers] may not find it 
cost efficient to compile the information.”  Id. at 474-75.  
Additionally, competitors may not provide that information, 
either because they do not have it themselves or because they 
may wish to collusively engage in the same behavior with 
their own customers so that “their interests would [not] be 
advanced by providing such information to consumers.”  Id. 
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at 474 & n.21 (citation omitted).  Customers’ information 
limitations could be paired with high switching costs so that 
 
consumers who already have purchased the 
equipment, and are thus “locked in,” will 
tolerate some level of service-price increases 
before changing equipment brands.  Under this 
scenario, a seller profitably could maintain 
supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket if the 
switching costs were high relative to the 
increase in service prices, and the number of 
locked-in customers were high relative to the 
number of new purchasers. 
 
Id. at 476.  In other words, tying liability may exist in an 
aftermarket where the seller can exploit customers who have 
already purchased the equipment and cannot easily shift to 
another brand. 
 
 The Supreme Court also posited that the threat of 
anticompetitive exploitation of aftermarkets in light of high 
information and switching costs would be particularly severe 
in cases where the seller could engage in price discrimination, 
i.e., charging different prices to different types of consumers.  
With respect to information costs, “if a company is able to 
price discriminate between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
consumers, the sophisticated will be unable to prevent the 
exploitation of the uninformed.”  Id.  at 475.  With respect to 
switching costs, “if the seller can price discriminate between 
its locked-in customers and potential new customers,” it can 
exploit locked-in customers with supracompetitive 
aftermarket prices while simultaneously charging low prices 
to new customers.  Id. at 476.  Those forms of price 
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discrimination could allow a savvy monopolistic seller to 
create a market tiered like a pyramid.  While charging lower 
lifecycle prices to sophisticated customers in the primary 
market, the seller could dupe low-information customers into 
paying a deceptively low upfront cost for the equipment, to 
lock them in due to high switching costs and set them up for 
supracompetitive prices in the aftermarkets for parts and 
service.  In the meantime, it could continue to make a normal 
competitive profit from sales to sophisticated new customers 
by charging them lower lifecycle prices through lower-priced 
long-term contracts.  Price discrimination thus allows a seller 
to run a multi-tier market dividing more sophisticated 
consumers from less sophisticated ones, while lock-in snares 
the unsophisticated customers once the proverbial trap has 
been sprung. 
 
 Not only was that theory sufficient to support § 1 
liability, the Court also held that it could support § 2 liability 
for unlawful monopolization.  In that analysis, the Court 
incorporated the § 1 analysis for whether the equipment 
market and the service and parts aftermarkets were distinct 
for antitrust purposes.  Id. at 481.  It was comfortable with 
defining a single-brand market as relevant for antitrust 
purposes as long as such a market was justified by “the 
choices available to ... equipment owners,” as “determined ... 
after a factual inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced by 
consumers.”  Id. at 482 (quoting United States v. Grinnell 
Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572 (1966)).  A successful plaintiff had 
to prove more, however, to succeed on a § 2 claim, because 
simply proving monopoly power in the aftermarket was not 
enough.  A § 2 claim additionally requires showing the use of 
that monopoly power “to foreclose competition, to gain a 
competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor.”  Id. at 
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482-83 (quoting United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 
(1948)).  Therefore, in defending against a § 2 claim, the 
seller has the opportunity to justify its actions so that 
“[l]iability turns ... on whether ‘valid business reasons’ can 
explain [its] actions.”  Id. at 483 (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. 
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985)).  
The Court was willing to consider as valid business reasons 
both controlling inventory costs and ensuring high quality 
maintenance service, but it did not consider the record in 
Kodak as sufficient to warrant summary judgment.  Id. at 
483-86. 
 
b. Third Circuit Elaboration of 
 Kodak 
 
Since Kodak, our Court has had the opportunity to 
develop that case’s theory of antitrust liability, most notably 
in a pair of cases called Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s 
Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430 (3d Cir. 1997), and Harrison Aire, 
Inc. v. Aerostar International, Inc., 423 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
 
In Queen City Pizza, we considered a Kodak-style 
claim by a group of franchisees against Domino’s Pizza, 
alleging that Domino’s had used its monopoly power over the 
market for franchise rights and proprietary pizza dough to 
restrain trade in the market for approved pizza supplies.  124 
F.3d at 434.  We affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 
because we did not consider the contractual requirement for 
franchisees to purchase pizza ingredients from Domino’s to 
implicate the concerns raised in Kodak.  Id. at 444.  We 
observed “that Domino’s approved supplies and ingredients 
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are fully interchangeable in all relevant respects with other 
pizza supplies” so that they were not unique in the way that 
Kodak parts were.  Id. at 440.  The plaintiffs were not, 
therefore, forced to purchase approved supplies because of 
the uniqueness of any Domino’s goods, but instead only 
“because they [were] bound by contract to do so.”  Id. at 441.  
In distinguishing that contractual obligation from the Kodak 
situation, we explained that, where the defendant’s forcing 
power “stems not from the market, but from plaintiffs’ 
contractual agreement ..., no claim will lie.”46  Id. at 443.  “If 
                                              
46 In Queen City Pizza, we talked, in part, of the 
defendant forcing “plaintiffs to purchase the ... tying 
product.”  124 F.3d at 443 (emphasis added).  That language 
was a result of the idiosyncratic nature of one of the tying 
theories alleged in that case.  Under that theory, the primary 
market was for restaurant franchise agreements, which in turn 
contractually bound franchisees to purchase the alleged 
“tying” product, fresh dough.  The franchisees contended that 
Domino’s “refused to sell fresh dough to [them] unless [they] 
purchased other ingredients and supplies from Domino’s,” id. 
at 434, so that the “other ingredients and supplies” were the 
“tied” product. 
The analogy here would be an argument that the 
primary market was for PBX systems, which “forced” the 
purchase of ODMCs and MSPs as the “tying” products, 
which were in turn allegedly used to force purchase of 
maintenance as the “tied” service.  No matter how many 
intermediate steps are alleged, however, in the end our 
concern is whether the defendant forced purchases of a tied 
product using power in some distinct market.  Jefferson 
Parish, 466 U.S. at 12.  Queen City Pizza stands for the 
proposition that if the supposed forcing is entirely the result 
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Domino’s ... acted unreasonably when ... it restricted 
plaintiffs’ ability to purchase supplies from other sources, 
plaintiffs’ remedy, if any, is in contract, not under the 
antitrust laws.”  Id. at 441. 
 
We also emphasized in Queen City Pizza that “[t]he 
Kodak case arose out of concerns about unilateral changes in 
Kodak’s parts and repairs policies.”  Id. at 440.  Because 
Kodak’s change in policy against independent maintenance 
providers “was not foreseen at the time of sale, buyers had no 
ability to calculate these higher costs at the time of purchase 
and incorporate them into their purchase decision.”  Id.  The 
Domino’s franchisees, on the other hand, “knew that 
Domino’s Pizza retained significant power over their ability 
to purchase cheaper supplies from alternative sources because 
that authority was spelled out in ... the ... franchise 
agreement,” so the “franchisees could assess the potential 
costs and economic risks at the time they signed the franchise 
agreement.”  Id.  If the franchisees found the contractual 
requirements “overly burdensome or risky at the time they 
were proposed, [they] could have purchased a different form 
of restaurant, or made some alternative investment,” id. at 
441, so that the transaction was “subjected to competition at 
the pre-contract stage,” id. at 440.  We thus characterized 
Kodak as concerned largely with the threat of unfair surprise 
for customers in the aftermarket, a threat ameliorated if the 
aftermarket terms were made clear in a primary market 
contract. 
                                                                                                     
of a transparent contractual agreement, then that is not the 
concern of the antitrust laws.  A plaintiff cannot avoid that 
outcome merely by crafting a complaint to allege 
intermediate steps. 
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In Harrison Aire, our Court’s second major case 
elaborating Kodak, we affirmed summary judgment against 
the Kodak-style claims of a hot air balloon operator that 
alleged that the balloon manufacturer had monopolized the 
aftermarket for replacement balloon fabric by tying the 
purchase of its own branded fabric to its balloons.  423 F.3d 
at 379, 386.  We explained that, in general, “[i]f the primary 
market is competitive, a firm exploiting its aftermarket 
customers ordinarily is engaged in a short-run game – for 
when buyers evaluate the ‘lifecycle’ cost of the product, the 
cost of the product over its full service life, they will shop 
elsewhere.”  Id. at 382.  The Kodak case is an exception to 
that general rule, based on a “market failure” in which 
“lifecycle pricing information is particularly difficult or 
impossible for primary market customers to acquire, as in the 
case of a unilateral change in aftermarket policy targeting 
‘locked in’ customers.”  Id.  We emphasized that “Kodak 
does not transform every firm with a dominant share of the 
relevant aftermarket into a monopolist,” and that a Kodak-
style “plaintiff must produce ‘hard evidence dissociating the 
competitive situation in the aftermarket from activities 
occurring in the primary market.’”  Id. at 383 (quoting SMS 
Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 
17 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
 
In evaluating the evidence in Harrison Aire, we 
cautioned that, although “[o]ne important consideration is 
whether a unilateral change in aftermarket policy exploits 
locked-in customers,” id. at 383, “an ‘aftermarket policy 
change’ is not the sine qua non of a Kodak claim,” id. at 384.  
Other factors to consider include “evidence of (1) 
supracompetitive pricing, (2) [the seller’s] dominant share of 
the relevant aftermarket, (3) significant information costs that 
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prevent[] lifecycle pricing, and (4) high ‘switching costs’ that 
serve[] to ‘lock in’ [the seller’s] aftermarket customers.”  Id.  
Applying those factors to the specific circumstances of the 
Harrison Aire case, we concluded that “[n]either information 
costs nor a unilateral change in aftermarket policy prevented 
[the plaintiff] from shopping for competitive lifecycle balloon 
prices when it purchased the ... balloon at issue.”  Id. at 384-
85.  Without “other evidence dissociating competitive 
conditions in the primary balloon market from conditions in 
the aftermarket for replacement fabric,” it was “clear that [the 
plaintiff] got precisely the balloon and the aftermarket fabric 
that it bargained for in the competitive primary market.”  Id. 
at 385.  Therefore, summary judgment against the 
monopolization claim was appropriate.47 
 
c. Synthesizing the Kodak Case 
 Law 
 
Kodak makes clear that, in certain limited 
circumstances, a competitive primary market will not insulate 
a defendant from antitrust liability.  But neither that case nor 
our subsequent case law overturns the more general principle 
that a plaintiff’s theory of antitrust liability must be 
economically plausible.  Thus, in the summary judgment 
context, “‘antitrust law limits the range of permissible 
                                              
47 We also affirmed summary judgment against the § 1 
tying claim raised in Harrison Aire because “[t]ying requires 
appreciable economic power in the tying product market,” 
and the plaintiff “fail[ed] to produce any evidence of 
appreciable market power in the tying product market” for hot 
air balloons.  423 F.3d at 385 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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inferences’ that can be drawn ‘from ambiguous evidence.’” 
Harrison Aire, 423 F.3d at 380 (quoting Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986)). 
 
That “higher threshold” for summary judgment “is 
imposed in antitrust cases to avoid deterring innocent conduct 
that reflects enhanced, rather than restrained, competition.”  
In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 
2004).  As the Supreme Court put it plainly in Kodak itself, 
“[i]f [a] plaintiff’s theory is economically senseless, no 
reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary 
judgment should be granted.”  504 U.S. at 468-69.  The 
requirement that a plaintiff make out an economically 
coherent theory of antitrust liability applies just as much to 
the pleading stage, where, to “make a § 1 claim,” a plaintiff 
must “identify[] facts that are suggestive enough to render a 
§ 1 [violation] plausible,” with sufficient “context” to “raise[] 
a suggestion” of unlawful anticompetitive conduct.  Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007).  The 
requirement that a plaintiff provide an economically plausible 
theory for its antitrust claims applies no less at trial than when 
a case is resolved by summary judgment or on the pleadings.  
 
With that in mind, we do not read – and have never 
read – Kodak to modify the requirement that a plaintiff in a 
tying case prove that the defendant has market power 
sufficient “to force a purchaser to do something that he would 
not do in a competitive market.”  Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. 
at 14.  In general, we expect a vibrant and competitive 
primary market to discipline and restrain power in related 
aftermarkets.  What Kodak stands for is the principle that 
there can be some exceptions to that expectation, when a 
plaintiff can produce a plausible economic theory of market 
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failure, supported by sufficient evidence.  In evaluating the 
issues in this case, we must consider just how broadly that 
Kodak exception should be read. 
 
A leading antitrust treatise seems to suggest that 
Kodak should be read as confined to the lock-in situation that 
was that opinion’s focus.  As that treatise distills the Kodak 
analysis: “Kodak could exploit locked-in customers with 
supracompetitive prices only if it could profitably (1) 
dispense with sophisticated new customers or (2) could 
discriminatorily overcharge only those existing customers 
whose exploitation would not affect new sales.”  Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, Fundamentals, supra, § 5.12, at 5-102 (Supp. 
2016).48  Those conditions will rarely obtain, and “[m]uch 
                                              
48 As that treatise explains those two elements in 
greater detail: 
when a defendant has no power in the [primary] 
market, it cannot profitably charge 
supracompetitive prices for unique [aftermarket 
products] to “locked in” users unless: 
1. it can profitably abandon selling new 
machines to sophisticated new 
customers who would understand that 
the machine’s cost is the sum of its 
nominal price plus the excess 
[maintenance] charges later ...; or 
2. it can price discriminate by 
identifying and overcharging only 
unsophisticated users and thus 
assuring competitive ... prices for 
new, sophisticated customers. 
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more typically, high aftermarket prices are explained as an 
offset to more intense competition in the foremarket good.”  
Id. at 5-103.  In that scholarly view, then, Kodak identified a 
pair of possible conditions in which primary market 
competition will not discipline aftermarket prices, but it 
should not be read as embracing any broader economic theory 
of tying liability. 
 
 We have not read Kodak quite so narrowly.  The 
Supreme Court emphasized that “[l]egal presumptions that 
rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market 
realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law” and that 
                                                                                                     
Unless one of these conditions is satisfied, the 
defendant without power in the [primary] 
market also lacks the power to charge 
supracompetitive prices for unique [aftermarket 
products]. 
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Fundamentals, supra, § 5.12, at 5-102 
to 103. 
 In a companion treatise, those scholars suggest going 
even further to limit the reach of Kodak in circumstances of 
competitive primary markets: 
Kodak does not foreclose a rebuttable 
presumption that lack of power in the relevant 
primary market (such as equipment) implies a 
lack of substantial power in derivative markets 
(such as parts or service).  Indeed, Kodak may 
even allow a conclusive presumption to this 
effect in order to simplify administration of the 
antitrust laws. 
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, 10 Antitrust Law 
¶ 1740, at 133 (3d ed. 2011). 
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antitrust claims should be resolved “on a case-by-case basis, 
focusing on the particular facts disclosed by the record.”  
Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass’n v. 
United States, 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925)).  In Harrison Aire, 
we declined to read Kodak as applying narrowly to only cases 
involving “[a]n aftermarket policy change,” because Kodak 
mandated that courts look at “several relevant factors.”  
Harrison Aire, 423 F.3d at 384.  The test is more broad: a 
plaintiff pursuing a Kodak-style claim must present evidence 
to support a plausible economic explanation that competition 
in the primary market is “dissociat[ed] ... from conditions in 
the aftermarket.”  Id. 
 
Showing exploitation of locked-in customers, as 
detailed in Kodak, is one way to satisfy that burden, but our 
own case law prevents us from concluding in the abstract that 
it is the only way to do so.  Therefore, we interpret Kodak as 
standing for two propositions: (1) that firms operating in a 
competitive primary market are not thereby categorically 
insulated from antitrust liability for their conduct in related 
aftermarkets; and (2) that exploitation of locked-in customers 
is one theory that courts will recognize to justify such 
liability.  Kodak identified factors to evaluate alleged 
anticompetitive aftermarket behavior, and it is possible that 
those factors may support a theory of antitrust liability that is 
not necessarily predicated on lock-in exploitation.  But any 
such alternative theory must satisfy the more general rule that 
an antitrust theory needs to “make[] ... economic sense” and 
be supported by the evidence.  Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 
 
Having laid out the applicable principles of law for 
Kodak-style tying and monopolization claims, we turn to their 
96 
 
application in the two surviving antitrust counterclaims in this 
case.49 
 
2. PBX Attempted Monopolization  
 Claim 
 
Avaya argues that we should reverse the PBX 
attempted monopolization judgment on two grounds.  First, it 
says that, once it introduced contract language in 2008 that 
made clear to customers that they would not be able to use 
ISPs, no Kodak claim could lie as a matter of law.  Second, it 
asserts that, as a matter of law, TLI’s evidence of predatory 
conduct is insufficient to support a § 2 attempted 
monopolization claim.  We agree that Avaya cannot be liable 
for PBX systems sold after the 2008 contracts were 
introduced, but we cannot conclude that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a verdict of liability for the pre-2008 
period. 
                                              
49 As a reminder, those surviving antitrust 
counterclaims are for attempted monopolization in the PBX 
maintenance services market, in violation of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act; and tying PDS software patches to maintenance 
services, in violation of §1 of the Sherman Act.  Given the 
arguments before us, ours is not to reason why the jury found 
those particular counterclaims compelling while rejecting the 
rest. 
“We exercise plenary review” over a district court’s 
decision on whether to grant judgment as a matter of law 
against a jury verdict, but we “must not weigh evidence, 
engage in credibility determinations, or substitute [our] 
version of the facts for the jury’s.”  Pitts v. Delaware, 646 
F.3d 151, 155 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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a. Post-2008 Sales Contracts 
 
According to Avaya, by May 2008, all purchasers of 
new PBX systems were on notice that they were contractually 
barred from using ISPs, so that there could be no antitrust 
aftermarket for maintenance.  It points out that the sales 
agreement that accompanied PBX systems at that point 
expressly provided for “[l]icense [r]estrictions” that made it 
clear to purchasers – sophisticated and unsophisticated alike – 
that they could not use ISPs for maintenance.  (J.A. 7283.)  
Specifically, § 6.2 of the sales agreement provided that the 
 
Customer agrees not to ... allow any service 
provider or other third party, with the exception 
of Avaya’s ... resellers and their designated 
employees ... to use or execute any software 
commands that cause the software to perform 
functions that facilitate the maintenance or 
repair of any Product except ... those software 
commands that ... would operate if ... [MSPs] 
were not enabled or activated[.] 
 
(Id.)  Even TLI’s CEO, Douglas Graham, testified that when 
Avaya introduced that version of the sales contract for its new 
PBX systems, it was “making it clear that ... part of buying [a 
PBX] is the customer giving up the ability to access an 
[ISP].”  (J.A. 2746.) 
 
In its post-trial opinion granting TLI’s request for an 
injunction, the District Court endorsed that view, even 
quoting Graham’s language.  Accordingly, it limited the 
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injunction against Avaya’s restraints on ISPs to cover only 
those PBX systems purchased prior to May 2008.50   
 
 We agree that no antitrust liability for a Kodak-style 
attempted monopolization claim could lie after May 2008 
when customers were put on clear notice that purchasing an 
Avaya PBX precluded use of ISP maintenance.  As we 
explained in Queen City Pizza, when the defendant’s power 
“stems not from the market, but from plaintiffs’ contractual 
agreement,” then “no claim will lie.”  124 F.3d at 443.  By 
May 2008, PBX customers were on clear notice that Avaya 
“retained significant power over their ability to purchase 
cheaper [maintenance] from alternative sources because that 
authority was spelled out in detail in section [6.2] of the 
standard [customer] agreement.”  Id. at 440.  If the customers 
viewed those terms as “overly burdensome ... at the time they 
were proposed, [they] could have purchased a different 
[brand] of [PBX].”  Id. at 441.  Avaya was therefore 
“subjected to competition at the pre-contract stage” in the 
primary market, id. at 440, which was undeniably 
competitive.  Absent a new and compelling economic theory 
to justify antitrust liability that reaches beyond Kodak – 
                                              
50 TLI seeks to downplay the effect of the post-2008 
customer agreements by arguing that they were “boilerplate” 
and “ambiguous” (Answering Br. at 36), and by arguing that 
there was “no evidence that any post-May 2008 Avaya PBX 
purchasers signed the form contracts” (id. at 38).  We 
conclude that there is no reason to disturb the District Court’s 
factual findings or legal conclusion on this point.  The 
contractual language is unambiguous, and TLI’s own CEO 
acknowledged the language’s clarity and its use beginning 
with the new PBX systems introduced in 2008.   
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which TLI has not provided – Avaya cannot be liable under 
the antitrust laws for enforcing a transparent contract freely 
agreed to in a competitive market. 
 
“The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect 
businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the 
public from the failure of the market.”  Spectrum Sports, Inc. 
v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993).  For PBX systems 
sold after May 2008, TLI could not credibly claim that Avaya 
was abusing its market power over locked-in customers.  
Instead, TLI’s complaint was with its potential customers, 
who had agreed to Avaya’s terms forbidding ISP maintenance 
in a competitive market.  TLI may wish that the PBX 
customers had demanded access to ISPs when negotiating 
with Avaya, but that is not a complaint cognizable under the 
antitrust laws.  Therefore, any PBX systems sold during and 
after May 2008 cannot be a basis for holding Avaya liable for 
attempted monopolization.  
 
b. Sufficiency of Evidence of  
 Predatory Conduct 
 
The Supreme Court has established that 
 
[t]he offense of monopoly under § 2 of the 
Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the 
possession of monopoly power in the relevant 
market and (2) the willful acquisition or 
maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence 
of a superior product, business acumen, or 
historic accident. 
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Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.  The purpose of that two-
element test for monopolization is to avoid imposing liability 
when a firm has come to possess a dominant market position 
in procompetitive fashion by simply out-competing its rivals 
with a superior product or service.  Therefore, even a firm 
with dominant market share will be liable only when its 
actions are predatory or anticompetitive in nature.  More 
specifically, a § 2 claim will lie only when “(1) ... the 
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive 
conduct with (2) a specific intent to monopolize and (3) a 
dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power.”  
Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456.  Phrased another way, the 
would-be monopolist must make “use of monopoly power ‘to 
foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to 
destroy a competitor.’”  Kodak, 504 U.S. at 482-83 (quoting 
Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107). 
 
Avaya argues that, as a matter of law, there was 
insufficient evidence of predatory conduct to sustain the 
conclusion that the second element of a § 2 claim had been 
proven.  According to Avaya, the allegedly predatory acts – 
e.g., terminating dealings with TLI; sending “fear, doubt, and 
uncertainty” letters to TLI’s maintenance customers; and 
trespassing and spying on TLI’s customers – cannot support a 
verdict of antitrust liability.  We find some merit to Avaya’s 
arguments that those individual acts may be justifiable and 
not anticompetitive, but we need not resolve this particular 
argument because it misses the forest for the trees. 
 
It is true that, in a traditional § 2 claim, a plaintiff 
would have to point to specific, egregious conduct that 
evinced a predatory motivation and a specific intent to 
monopolize.  See Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 456.  But in 
101 
 
the context of a Kodak claim, any proof that the primary 
market and the aftermarket are separate for antitrust purposes 
will necessarily include substantial evidence of predatory 
conduct.  The basis of a prototypical Kodak claim is that 
through some combination of price discrimination and post-
sale surprise in the aftermarket, the defendant has managed to 
dissociate a competitive primary market from an aftermarket 
that the defendant dominates.  In Kodak, that domination was 
through control over proprietary parts; here, it is alleged to 
exist through control of proprietary software.  If a Kodak 
defendant has managed to create a relevant antitrust 
aftermarket, then, it has necessarily acted to “foreclose 
competition,” Griffith, 334 U.S. at 107, or to achieve the 
“willful acquisition ... of monopoly power,” Kodak, 504 U.S. 
at 483.  In this case, there is no question that Avaya 
dominates the market for maintenance services on its system, 
or that control over the maintenance market was the express 
intent of its efforts to exclude ISPs.  Its every action giving 
rise to this litigation evinces an intent to dominate the 
maintenance market.  The central antitrust question, then, is 
whether that market is dissociated from the primary PBX 
market in a way that makes such domination anticompetitive. 
 
 Without itself resolving whether a Kodak claim will 
necessarily include significant evidence of predation, the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Kodak suggested that our 
approach is the right one.  In considering the predation prong 
of § 2 claims, the Court in Kodak merely incorporated its 
prior analysis of market separation to conclude that the 
plaintiffs had “presented evidence that Kodak took 
exclusionary action to maintain its parts monopoly and used 
its control over parts to strengthen its monopoly share of the 
Kodak service market.”  Id.  If we substitute “Avaya” for 
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“Kodak” and “ODMCs/MSPs” for “parts,” we can write the 
same sentence in this case.  Rather than requiring some proof 
of additional predatory conduct in the maintenance market, 
that portion of the Kodak opinion focused instead on Kodak’s 
affirmative defense that “‘valid business reasons’ [could] 
explain [its] actions.”  Id. (quoting Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 
605). 
 
We apply the same analysis here.  The evidence that 
convinced the jury that Avaya has dissociated the primary 
market from the aftermarket is sufficient to show 
exclusionary conduct for purposes of § 2.  For that reason, we 
reject Avaya’s request for judgment as a matter of law 
because it asks for proof of additional predatory conduct that 
is unnecessary in a case like this.51 
 
3. PDS Tying Claim 
 
Avaya also asks us to reverse the judgment against it 
for unlawfully tying PDS patches to maintenance, arguing 
that there was insufficient evidence to support any finding 
that there was a distinct aftermarket for patches.  Before 
                                              
51 Our reading of Kodak further bolsters our conclusion 
that the District Court’s judgment as a matter of law on 
Avaya’s common law claims necessarily prejudiced the 
antitrust verdict.  Protecting itself from tortious forms of 
competition may well have been a valid business reason to 
engage in defensive exclusionary conduct, and that kind of 
affirmative defense was the crux of the Kodak opinion’s § 2 
analysis.  That Avaya was not able to make such an argument 
to the jury improperly hindered its defense against TLI’s § 2 
claims. 
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October 2007, Avaya argues, it “made patches freely 
available to all Avaya PDS owners without requiring them to 
purchase Avaya maintenance.”  (Opening Br. at 75.)  The 
patches were available on Avaya’s website for any PDS 
owner to access, irrespective of who provided system 
maintenance.  At trial, TLI’s CEO agreed with that, and a 
representative of SunTrust – the one customer that TLI put on 
as evidence for its PDS tying claim – testified that TLI was 
able to provide patches during the entire period that SunTrust 
hired TLI for maintenance.  For PDS hardware sold from 
October 2007 onward, Avaya did restrict access to its PDS 
patches to users of Avaya’s own support services, but the 
requirement to purchase Avaya support with the PDS 
hardware was made clear at the time of sale.  Indeed, the 
SunTrust representative testified that when the firm purchased 
a new Avaya PDS after October 2007, it was informed that it 
would be required to purchase Avaya support and, if it wished 
to receive patches, could not use an ISP.   
 
TLI does not challenge those basic facts, but it argues 
that the PDS verdict can nonetheless stand.  As to the pre-
2007 period, it argues that “Avaya used the threat of 
withholding patches to coerce PDS owners into purchasing 
maintenance from Avaya” (Answering Br. at 64), so that, 
even though the patches were formally available for free, 
Avaya still effected a tie.  TLI points, as an example, to a 
letter sent in 2005 to PDS customers telling them that they 
risked losing access to a host of services, including patches, if 
they “ch[o]se to engage an Unauthorized Service Provider for 
services,” and threatening that “Avaya will take all necessary 
legal action against violators in order to protect Avaya 
proprietary intellectual property.”  (J.A. 6945.)  As to the 
post-2007 period, TLI argues that “Avaya PDS owners were 
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not made aware of ... Avaya’s policies.”  (Answering Br. at 
67.)  Moreover, even if the policy was transparent, TLI argues 
that there was nonetheless sufficient evidence that the 
“patches aftermarket ... was not disciplined by the primary 
PDS market.”  (Id. at 66.) 
 
The 2005 letter to PDS customers, like the PBX FUD 
letters, was no doubt a frustration to TLI in its own efforts to 
build its business.  Avaya was indeed intent on dominating its 
own intra-brand market.  But that does not mean that Avaya 
fell afoul of the antitrust laws, which “were enacted for ‘the 
protection of competition not competitors.’”  Brunswick 
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 
(1962)).  It is undisputed that Avaya’s patches were freely 
available to customers on its website without any strings 
attached before 2007, and the only witness put forward by 
TLI to prove the efficaciousness of Avaya’s threats 
acknowledged that his firm was freely able to receive patches 
through TLI.  “[W]here the buyer is free to take either 
product by itself there is no tying problem even though the 
seller may also offer the two items as a unit at a single price.”  
Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 6 n.4.  Given that Avaya 
offered the patches freely to PDS customers, TLI needed to 
put forward compelling evidence that Avaya was somehow 
nevertheless effecting a de facto tie between patches and 
maintenance.  Were TLI to prevail on vague allegations that a 
strongly-worded letter was as effective as a technological or 
contractual tie, that would dramatically expand the reach of 
tying liability.  The Kodak standard demands more, and we 
accordingly agree that the evidence before the jury was 
insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a tying claim 
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pertaining to PDS systems sold before October 2007, while 
patches were still freely available. 
 
As for PDS systems sold after Avaya’s October 2007 
policy went into effect, TLI’s tying claim runs into the same 
problems as did its claim for antitrust injury in the post-2008 
PBX market – Avaya introduced clear contractual language in 
the primary market prohibiting ISP use.  If new PDS 
customers considered the requirements to purchase Avaya 
software support and to refrain from using ISPs “overly 
burdensome ... at the time they were proposed, [the buyers] 
could have purchased a different [brand] of [PDS].”  Queen 
City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 441.  Where the primary market is 
indisputably competitive – and there is no dispute here that it 
was and is – a plaintiff must show special circumstances, such 
as Kodak-style lock-in, to overcome the inference that such 
competition will discipline any related intra-brand 
aftermarkets.  Given that post-2007 PDS customers were 
required to purchase an Avaya service plan with their PDS, 
the link of PDS and maintenance service was fully transparent 
in the primary market.  That undermines any argument for 
Kodak-style lock-in or aftermarket surprise that TLI could 
make.  Having no alternative theory, its PDS tying claim also 
fails as a matter of law for the post-October 2007 period. 
 
 We therefore reverse the jury’s entire PDS tying 
verdict and remand with instructions for the District Court to 
enter judgment for Avaya on that claim.  Given that result, we 
pause briefly to note that our reversal of the PDS verdict 
would endanger the validity of the damages award, even if we 
were not otherwise vacating it because of the District Court’s 
errors regarding the common law claims.  “Where a jury has 
returned a general verdict and one theory of liability is not 
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sustained by the evidence or legally sound, the verdict cannot 
stand because the court cannot determine whether the jury 
based its verdict on an improper ground.”  Wilburn v. 
Maritrans GP Inc., 139 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citations omitted); see also Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637, 646 
(3d Cir. 1980) (Where “[i]t is ... impossible to determine if 
the jury based its verdict on all” the allegedly unlawful acts 
“or ... on only one,” then “there is the distinct possibility that 
if we affirm the jury’s verdict, we may do so on the basis of” 
lawful acts.); Albergo v. Reading Co., 372 F.2d 83, 86 (3d 
Cir. 1966) (“Where, as here, a general verdict may rest on 
either of two claims – one supported by the evidence and the 
other not – a judgment thereon must be reversed.”). 
 
In this case, the verdict form merely asked the jury to 
name “the total amount of damages, if any, that ... TLI[] has 
proven ... were caused by Avaya’s violation(s) of the antitrust 
laws.”  (J.A. 640.)  There is therefore no way to discern 
which portion of the damages the jury attributed to the PDS 
tying claim, and which to the PBX attempted monopolization 
claim.  It is true that the PBX market is substantially larger, 
but if we affirmed the damages verdict on the basis of the pre-
2008 PBX claim alone, we would nonetheless risk the 
“distinct possibility that ... we may do so on the basis of” 
damages attributable to a liability theory that is invalid.  
Avins, 627 F.3d at 646.  Moreover, the jury lacked a cogent 
way to disaggregate the PBX and PDS damages in the first 
place because TLI’s expert offered testimony based on 
combined damages.52  We therefore have no way to know 
                                              
52 Moreover, the damages expert’s two models 
projected damages of between $133 million and $147 million, 
a far cry from the jury’s finding of $20 million in damages.  
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what portion of the damages verdict is attributable to the 
invalid PDS tying liability theory, which independently 
requires vacatur of the damages award.53 
                                                                                                     
In trying to figure out what portion of that award was 
attributable to which systems, we would have a hard time 
reasoning how the jury came to its number in the first place, 
much less how much is attributable to a liability theory that 
survives this appeal.  
 
53 The parties also fight over the jury instructions, but 
those are arguments we need not resolve because we are 
vacating the verdict on other grounds.  Some comment is 
nevertheless in order.  Avaya complains that the District 
Court simply gave the jury a list of factors to consider in an 
“uncabined” manner to determine whether the primary market 
was dissociated from the maintenance aftermarket.  (Opening 
Br. at 52.)  Although there is some merit to that complaint, 
there is also much to applaud in the District Court’s efforts to 
distill and describe this complex area of law for the jury.  In 
particular, we appreciate that the Court properly identified 
from Kodak and our precedents relevant factors for the jury’s 
consideration.   
We agree, however, that – if there is a retrial – the 
Court should consider describing to the jury a logical path for 
it to follow in evaluating whether the primary market is 
dissociated from the aftermarket.  For example, with respect 
to the PBX attempted monopolization claim, a theory of 
dissociation by aftermarket surprise in this case might run as 
follows: 
1. If you find that customers could not have predicted 
that Avaya would condition their use of MSPs and 
ODMCs on customers’ refusal to use ISPs, you may 
108 
 
                                                                                                     
conclude that Avaya enacted a surprise aftermarket 
policy change. 
2. If you determine that Avaya enacted such an 
aftermarket policy change, you must then evaluate 
whether Avaya had the ability to exercise market 
power in the aftermarket.  To reach such a conclusion, 
you must conclude that Avaya and its Business 
Partners were able to exclude competitors in the 
aftermarket, and that switching costs in the primary 
market locked in customers. 
3. If you determine that Avaya enacted a surprise 
aftermarket policy change and that it had market 
power in the aftermarket, you may then decide whether 
it was possible for Avaya to use that market power to 
exploit customers.  To find the possibility of 
exploitation, you must conclude that Avaya had the 
ability to charge supracompetitive prices in the 
aftermarket. 
4. If, and only if, you reach all three of the prior 
conclusions, may you find that the PBX maintenance 
market was a relevant antitrust aftermarket. 
The foregoing example is not meant as a directive that the 
District Court must follow, but rather as one proposed 
approach to “channel” – as Avaya puts it – the jury’s 
consideration of the factors identified in Kodak.  (Opening Br. 
at 53.) 
Avaya also appealed the District Court’s decision to 
grant TLI prejudgment interest on the basis of what it 
determined to be Avaya’s vexatious litigation strategy.  
Because we vacate the verdict and the corresponding 
damages award, the issue of prejudgment interest is moot, and 
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IV. TLI’s Cross-Appeals 
 
Having resolved Avaya’s appeals, we turn now to 
TLI’s cross-appeals.  It challenges the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment against two of its tort counterclaims 
and against one of its antitrust counterclaims.  It also 
challenges the District Court’s decision under the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine that TLI could not use Avaya’s litigation 
conduct as evidence of anticompetitive behavior.  All of those 
rulings are sound, and TLI’s arguments are not.54 
 
A. Summary Judgment on TLI’s Common Law 
 Claims 
 
We begin with the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment against TLI’s counterclaims for trade libel and for 
tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.  
Both claims were based on the so-called FUD letters that 
Avaya sent to existing and prospective TLI customers.  The 
tortious interference claim was also based on Avaya’s 
                                                                                                     
we decline to address it.  The question may be considered 
afresh, if necessary, following retrial. 
 
54 Our review of a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Boyle v. Cty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 
386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998).  “[S]ummary judgment may be 
granted if the movant shows that there exists no genuine issue 
of material fact that would permit a reasonable jury to find for 
the nonmoving party.  All facts and inferences are construed 
in the light most favorable to the non[]moving party.”  Id.  
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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deactivation of TLI customers’ MSPs.  The District Court 
granted summary judgment against TLI on those claims on 
the ground that TLI did not present sufficient evidence to 
create a dispute of material fact over whether Avaya’s 
conduct actually caused TLI any loss in business.55 
                                              
55 The parties dispute whether the District Court 
applied the correct legal standards for the tort claims.  For 
tortious interference, “New Jersey law requires that a plaintiff 
... present proof that but for the acts of the defendant, the 
plaintiff would have received the anticipated economic 
benefits.”  Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1168 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  TLI disputes whether the District Court 
actually applied that “but for” test, suggesting that it 
improperly demanded that TLI prove that Avaya’s actions 
were the sole cause of injury.  Despite some potentially 
confusing language, the District Court’s opinion did apply the 
“but for” test as explicated in Lightning Lube.  TLI also 
argues that the District Court should have instead applied a 
test evaluating whether Avaya’s conduct was a “substantial 
factor” in causing TLI’s injury.  See Verdicchio v. Ricca, 843 
A.2d 1042, 1056 (N.J. 2004) (applying the “substantial 
factor” test in a medical malpractice case).  Because a 
“substantial factor” causation test would not have altered the 
result, we need not consider whether it was more appropriate. 
With regard to the legal standard for trade libel, both 
parties agree that TLI had to prove special damages.  TLI 
wanted the Court to apply a “material and substantial part” 
test for causation of those damage, see Patel v. Soriano, 848 
A.2d 803, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), whereas 
Avaya supports the “natural and direct result” standard that 
the District Court did apply, see Mayflower Transit, LLC v. 
Prince, 314 F. Supp. 2d 362, 378 (D.N.J. 2004).  Again, we 
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The District Court provided a detailed explanation of 
the deficiency of the evidence before it.  As to the MSP 
deactivations, the Court observed that MSP access was not 
required to provide maintenance, citing TLI’s own 
interrogatory responses about alternative methods that it in 
fact used to provide service to customers.  As the Court 
explained, TLI “used ... default passwords or hired a third 
party to determine active passwords,” so that “whether MSPs 
were activated had little bearing on whether [TLI] could 
provide maintenance to customers.”  (J.A. 105.)56  Those 
alternative methods were sufficiently successful, in fact, that 
they led Avaya to bring suit against TLI, alleging that they 
were unlawful and resulted in the loss to Avaya of significant 
business. 
 
As to the FUD letters, the District Court decided that 
TLI had not “come forth with sufficient evidence that the 
Avaya letters were the de facto cause of the loss of current 
and prospective maintenance contracts.”  (J.A. 105.)  TLI’s 
examples of lost contracts were not at all persuasive.  For 
instance, TLI suggested that the State of Michigan was one 
such lost contract, but an employee of that state testified that 
there were “numerous reasons” not to use TLI – unrelated to 
                                                                                                     
need not resolve which standard is correct because the 
outcome is the same under either. 
 
56 At trial, Scott Graham validated the District Court’s 
conclusion when he testified that he was “[n]ot ... aware of” a 
case in which TLI was not able to get “into the maintenance 
software” of a prospective customer.  (J.A. 2443.)  In fact, it 
is “[c]orrect” that TLI was “always successful.”  (Id.) 
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Avaya, and some directly caused by TLI – and that she was 
not under any “impression that Avaya would sue the State of 
Michigan if it awarded the contract to [TLI].”  (J.A. 106.)57  
The only specific example TLI provided of a customer who 
declined its services because of a FUD letter was 
substantiated only by an email – inadmissible as hearsay – 
sent by a TLI employee complaining about the lost contract.  
Finally, the Court refused to draw any inferences from the 
report of TLI’s damages expert on the grounds that it was 
“not supported ... by affidavits or any other evidence that 
would be admissible at trial.”  (J.A. 108.) 
 
In this appeal, TLI relies principally upon that expert 
report and contests the District Court’s characterization of it, 
arguing vaguely that the report was based on “business 
records [and] excerpts from depositions of customers and 
TLI[] employees.”  (Answering Br. at 93.)  In support of that 
contention, TLI cites the expert’s certification, in which he 
declared that he “relied upon facts, data and work typically 
relied upon by experts in the economic/accounting industry.”  
(Suppl. App. 10.)  TLI also cites 93 pages of inscrutable 
spreadsheets in which the expert – without explanation – 
assigned various damages to contracts that TLI allegedly lost 
due to Avaya’s conduct.   
 
                                              
57 Other examples provided by TLI were similarly 
unimpressive.  For instance, TLI relied on a cease and desist 
letter that it sent to Avaya in 2010.  The District Court 
concluded that the mere existence of such a letter “is no more 
helpful to the Court on summary judgment than ... pleadings,” 
without additional “evidence sufficient to prove that the 
allegations made in the ... letter are in fact true.”  (J.A. 107.) 
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The District Court’s rejection of TLI’s argument was 
thoroughly justified.  The evidence TLI offered in opposing 
summary judgment consisted of naked accusations that 
Avaya’s conduct cost it business.  That the allegations were 
recited by an expert witness or by TLI employees does not 
bolster them.58  See Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 
F.3d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[E]xpert testimony without 
... a factual foundation cannot defeat a motion for summary 
judgment.”).  Even now on appeal, after a decade of 
litigation, TLI cannot point to one specific example where it 
has credible evidence that Avaya’s allegedly tortious conduct 
harmed its business.  We therefore agree with the District 
Court that TLI failed to present sufficient evidence to create a 
material dispute of fact about whether Avaya’s MSP 
deactivations or FUD letters caused injury to TLI.  Summary 
judgment was appropriate on both the tortious interference 
and the trade libel claims. 
 
B. Summary Judgment on PBX Upgrade Tying 
 Claim 
 
The jury rejected TLI’s § 1 tying claim for the PBX 
market and found that there was no relevant antitrust 
aftermarket for PBX patches, but TLI nonetheless asks us to 
revive a separate § 1 tying claim.  It appeals the District 
                                              
58 The expert’s credibility is further undermined by the 
fact that at a subsequent Daubert hearing, the District Court 
determined that he was “‘[c]learly ... not competent’ to testify 
about an individual customer’s motivations.”  (Third Step Br. 
at 62 (alteration and omission in original) (quoting J.A. 
4071).) 
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Court’s grant of summary judgment against its claim that 
Avaya unlawfully tied PBX upgrades and maintenance. 
 
Before addressing the reasoning of the District Court, 
we note that, in light of our already-set-forth explanation of 
Kodak-style tying claims, we are skeptical of the tying claim 
regarding PBX upgrades, especially given the jury’s rejection 
of the tying claim related to PBX software patches.  
Upgrading a PBX system requires a customer to step back 
into the competitive primary PBX market, thereby at least 
partially ameliorating any lock-in concern and making it less 
likely that Avaya could dissociate the primary market from an 
aftermarket.  We acknowledge that in the PBX upgrade 
market there may still be some reliance on past investments in 
an old Avaya system, but if the jury rejected the notion that 
PBX patches satisfied the Kodak theory – when patches are 
strictly aftermarket products – we doubt that it would have 
been more sympathetic to an argument that upgrades were 
unlawfully used as a tie. 
 
Antitrust theory aside, the District Court granted 
summary judgment for the simple reason that TLI had failed 
to present any substantial evidence that Avaya’s alleged 
threats to withhold upgrades had actually affected “a 
substantial amount of interstate commerce,” as required to 
make out a § 1 claim.  (J.A. 165.)  It characterized TLI’s 
proffered evidence as consisting of “little more than 
assertions,” which the “Court [found] insufficient.”  (Id.)  
That evidence – which TLI presses upon us anew on appeal – 
again consists of expert reports arguing that Avaya used 
upgrades as part of a scheme to foreclose competition in the 
maintenance market.  Avaya defends the District Court by 
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arguing that that “evidence” was merely unsupported 
assertions filtered through TLI’s experts.   
 
Reviewing the record ourselves, and drawing all 
reasonable inferences in favor of TLI, we find ourselves in 
agreement with Avaya and the District Court.  In opposing 
summary judgment, TLI presented no evidence to raise an 
issue of material fact about whether Avaya was able to harm 
TLI by using PBX upgrades to restrain competition in the 
maintenance market. We will therefore also affirm that aspect 
of the District Court’s summary judgment order. 59 
 
C.  Noerr-Pennington Ruling 
 
The final issue we consider is TLI’s cross-appeal of 
the District Court’s ruling, under the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine, that TLI could not present evidence at trial of 
Avaya’s litigation conduct as a basis for the accusation of 
monopolistic conduct.  “Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 
– established by Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. 
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) – 
defendants are immune from antitrust liability for engaging in 
conduct (including litigation) aimed at influencing 
                                              
59 We note, however, that insofar as TLI may have 
later developed more evidence on the use of upgrades to tie, 
that evidence remains relevant to TLI’s attempted 
monopolization claim. There is nothing to prevent TLI from 
presenting the upgrade tying theory to the jury as part of its 
surviving § 2 claim on remand, but that does not ameliorate 
the fact that its evidence at the summary judgment stage was 
so scant. 
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decisionmaking by the government.”  Octane Fitness, LLC v. 
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1757 (2014) 
(citation omitted).  In Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. 
v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993), the 
Supreme Court explained that “sham” litigation – unlike 
ordinary litigation – is not off limits as a source of antitrust 
liability.  The Court gave a two-part test for identifying a 
lawsuit as a sham: “First, the lawsuit must be objectively 
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could 
realistically expect success on the merits. ...  [S]econd[,] ... 
the baseless lawsuit conceals ‘an attempt to interfere directly 
with the business relationships of a competitor,’” id. at 60-61 
(emphasis removed) (quoting  Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144), 
“through the ‘use of the governmental process – as opposed 
to the outcome of that process – as an anticompetitive 
weapon,’” id. at 61 (alteration and emphases removed) 
(quoting City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 
U.S. 365, 380 (1991)). 
 
TLI challenges the District Court’s contention that “the 
whole case has to be a sham” for the sham exception to apply.  
(Suppl. App. 190.)  Instead, TLI argues, the sham exception 
should be applied on a claim-by-claim basis.  Avaya responds 
by citing the language in Professional Real Estate that refers 
to a “lawsuit” rather than a claim, and which references the 
“governmental process” rather than any specific action in a 
suit.  It also argues that, as a policy matter, adopting a claim-
by-claim “approach would introduce extraordinary 
complexity into jury deliberations” by forcing juries to not 
only decide the merits of each claim but also decide which are 
objectively reasonable or not.  (Third Step Br. at 66.)  As the 
District Court noted when ruling on the issue, cases often 
involve claims of varying degrees of merit, many of which 
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are weeded out pre-trial, and it would be impractical to run a 
litigation system that made those kinds of claims subject to 
antitrust suits.   
 
We agree with that conclusion.  True, one might 
imagine a situation where a single claim, separated from an 
otherwise arguably meritorious suit, is so harmful and costly 
to a defendant that it might impose anticompetitive harm on 
the defendant in a way that triggers the sham litigation 
exception to Noerr-Pennington.  But the Supreme Court’s 
elaboration of the “sham” exception suggests that we should 
not go hunting for that example, and this case is not it.  Some 
of Avaya’s claims that were dismissed before trial may have 
been weak, but they were part and parcel of a course of 
litigation that proceeded to two months of substantial 
evidence and argument to a jury.  We do not consider 
Avaya’s affirmative claims to be frivolous or unsubstantiated; 
in fact, we are vacating the Rule 50 judgment that was 
entered against them.  TLI may consider Avaya’s litigation 
conduct vexatious – as the District Court did in awarding 
prejudgment interest – but its suit against TLI was not a 
“sham.”60  We therefore affirm the District Court’s ruling that 
Avaya’s litigation conduct was protected from antitrust 
liability by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 
 
                                              
60 Which is not to say that we endorse the District 
Court’s determination that the award of prejudgment interest 
was appropriate in this case.  Again, Avaya’s present 
challenge to that award has been mooted by our disposition 
with respect to the other claims presented. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of the District Court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  We will also reverse the 
judgment of liability on the entire PDS tying claim and on the 
PBX attempted monopolization claim as to the post-2008 
time period and will remand with instructions to enter 
judgment as a matter of law for Avaya on those claims.  We 
will affirm the orders of the District Court as to all issues 
raised by TLI’s cross-appeal. 
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Avaya, Inc. v. Telecom Labs, Inc.; TeamTLI.com Corp.; 
Continuant, Inc.; Scott Graham; Douglas Graham; Bruce 
Shelby, Nos. 14-4174, 14-4277  
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.   
For litigation that has lasted some fifteen years, this 
appeal involves remarkably few disputed facts. The trouble 
began soon after Plaintiff Avaya (the Goliath of this saga) 
laid off many of its workers because of a downturn in the 
telecommunications market in 2000. Those layoffs gave rise 
to independent companies that offered aftermarket 
maintenance on the Private Branch Exchanges (PBXs) sold 
by Avaya. In fact, Avaya provided training and subsidies to 
companies that hired its former employees, and some 
companies became authorized Avaya dealers or business 
partners. Defendant TLI (the David of the saga) became one 
of those official business partners.  
TLI obtained its first customer in 2001 and invested 
millions in its maintenance business. For whatever reason, 
Avaya reversed course in 2002 and began limiting the ability 
of its business partners, customers, and independent 
(unauthorized) providers to perform PBX maintenance. This 
change in strategy resulted in the creation of the Avaya One 
contract, which required Avaya business partners to promise 
not to solicit maintenance business from selected Avaya 
customers. Some 300 Avaya One contracts were signed and 
TLI signed its contract on March 21, 2003. Unlike all of 
Avaya’s other business partners, however, TLI negotiated a 
handwritten modification to its covenant not to compete that 
expressly authorized TLI to solicit maintenance business from 
certain Avaya customers. This modification was the spark 
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that ignited the forest fire that continues to rage twelve years 
later. 
When Avaya’s Head of Global Sales, Linda 
Schumacher, learned of the carve-out TLI had negotiated, she 
was “shocked” and quickly took steps to cancel TLI’s 
contract just four months after it was signed. On July 31, 
2003, Avaya gave the required 60 days’ notice that it was 
terminating the contract and spent the months of August and 
September notifying TLI’s customers that it soon would no 
longer be an Avaya business partner. Claiming antitrust 
violations, TLI went to federal court seeking an injunction 
requiring Avaya to allow TLI access to the codes necessary to 
maintain its customers’ machines. The court denied the 
injunction and TLI dropped the case.  
Undeterred, TLI used a variety of methods to access its 
customers’ PBXs in order to perform maintenance. TLI 
accessed some machines by using passwords and logins it had 
received previously and it obtained others from the internet. 
Some of TLI’s customers had purchased permissions for the 
life of their machines, which enabled TLI to provide 
maintenance by using those logins. Other methods used by 
TLI were deceitful and/or unethical. For example, some 
Avaya business partners acted as conduits for TLI by posing 
as the maintenance provider, only to pass along the 
credentials to TLI. TLI also employed two former Avaya 
employees, David Creswick and Harold Hall, who used what 
they had learned to “hack and crack” the PBXs of TLI’s 
customers to obtain the credentials necessary to service them. 
In short, even after TLI was terminated as an Avaya business 
partner, TLI used various methods to provide aftermarket 
maintenance—a service that purchasers of Avaya’s PBXs 
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were expressly authorized by contract to provide for 
themselves or to hire third parties like TLI to provide. 
Avaya sued TLI in federal court in 2006, alleging 
numerous causes of action under federal and state law. After 
seven years of scorched-earth litigation, Avaya withdrew six 
claims just days before the trial began. For almost two 
months, Avaya put on evidence in support of its seven 
remaining claims. At the conclusion of Avaya’s case-in-chief, 
TLI moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The District Court 
granted TLI’s motions, throwing out Avaya’s case in its 
entirety.  
My colleagues on the panel, both experienced former 
trial lawyers and trial judges, conclude that the District Court 
committed legal error when it granted TLI’s Rule 50 motions. 
Although I had far less experience as a trial lawyer and trial 
judge than my distinguished colleagues, my visceral reaction 
to the Court’s Rule 50 decision is consistent with theirs. The 
question looms large: Why, after seven years of discovery 
and two months of trial, did a jurist with 22 years of 
experience not allow any of Avaya’s claims go to the jury? 
To ask the question implies the imprudence of the decision, at 
least on an instinctual level. But visceral reactions aren’t 
always correct, and I must say that after reading the entire 
transcript of the trial, I agree with Judge Irenas’s 52-page 
opinion explaining his reasons for throwing out Avaya’s case. 
After seven years, Avaya finally withdrew almost all of its 
federal claims. The seven state-law claims that remained—
which involved breach of contract, fraud, and unfair 
competition—simply were not proven at trial. At the end of 
the day, my assessment of Avaya’s case-in-chief is the same 
4 
 
as the District Court’s: full of sturm und drang, but 
insubstantial.  
Having expressed my opinion on that score, I confess 
enough doubt about the propriety of the District Court’s 
decision to grant the Rule 50 motion that the focus of my 
partial dissent presumes the correctness of my colleagues’ 
opinion on that point. Instead, I take issue with the decision to 
vacate the judgment TLI earned on two of its counterclaims 
arising under the antitrust laws. Even assuming, arguendo, 
that the District Court erred when it granted TLI’s Rule 50 
motions, I remain convinced that any error had little or no 
impact on the verdicts in favor of TLI. In my estimation, 
David struck Goliath right between the eyes and should not 
be deprived of his hard-earned victory on the counterclaims. 
The crux of my partial dissent is that I cannot agree 
that the District Court’s rejection of Avaya’s claims “taint[ed] 
the entire trial and the ultimate verdict.” Majority Op. 6. 
Perhaps I would find greater assurance in the Majority’s taint 
analysis if Avaya had adequately raised it. I have serious 
doubts that it did. Even still—without the benefit of 
developed adversarial briefing on the issue—I do not believe 
the District Court’s judgment as a matter of law so impaired 
Avaya’s ability to defend itself against TLI’s allegations of 
anticompetitive conduct that we cannot have confidence in 
the jury verdict as a whole. For that reason, I would affirm the 
verdict with respect to Avaya’s pre-2008 attempted 
monopolization of the PBX maintenance aftermarket and I 
5 
 
respectfully dissent from the Majority’s holding to the 
contrary.1  
                                              
1 Although I believe the jury was properly instructed as 
to the factors for finding a relevant antitrust aftermarket for 
Avaya PBX system maintenance and could have reasonably 
found Avaya liable for attempted monopolization of that 
aftermarket prior to its introduction of transparent sales 
contracts in May 2008, I agree with the Majority that Avaya 
cannot be held liable for PBX systems sold after that time. I 
also agree that the jury could not have reasonably found 
Avaya liable for tying PDS patches to maintenance either 
before 2007 (the patches were free, so there was no coercion) 
or after (the conditions were clear upfront, so there was no 
relevant antitrust aftermarket). Moreover, because the general 
verdict did not dissociate damages stemming from attempted 
monopolization of the PBX maintenance aftermarket from 
those attributable to the alleged PDS tying, I agree that the 
damages award must be vacated and that we therefore need 
not reach the issue whether the District Court abused its 
discretion in granting TLI’s motion for prejudgment interest 
under the Clayton Act. I also join the Majority’s rejection of 
TLI’s cross-appeals.  
Finally, I commend Judge Jordan for his rigorous 
synthesis of the Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical 
Services Inc. branch of antitrust law, which has bedeviled 
litigants and courts alike. I agree with his analysis 
wholeheartedly. Because the District Court’s jury instructions 
comport with the principles outlined by Judge Jordan, I would 
hold that they were sufficient to “properly apprise[] the jury 
of the issues and the applicable law.” Smith v. Borough of 
Wilkinsburg, 147 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 1998) (quotation 
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I 
 Under both the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and our Local Rules, “appellants are required to set forth the 
issues raised on appeal and to present an argument in support 
of those issues in their opening brief.” Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 
F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993).  A “passing reference to an 
issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.” 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am. v. Foster Wheeler Energy 
Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (omission in original) 
(quotation marks omitted) (quoting Simmons v. City of 
Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1066 (3d Cir. 1991)). And the 
argument must include the “appellant’s contentions and the 
reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of 
the record on which the appellant relies.” F.R.A.P. 
28(a)(8)(A); see also Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1065 (explaining 
that “briefs must contain statements of all issues presented for 
appeal, together with supporting arguments and citations”). 
Casual assertions supported only by “cursory treatment” do 
not suffice. Kost, 1 F.3d at 182. If a claim of error is 
“unaccompanied by developed argument,” it is forfeited. 
Rodriguez v. Municipality of San Juan, 659 F.3d 168, 175 
(1st Cir. 2011); Kost, 1 F.3d at 182. 2   
                                                                                                     
marks omitted) (quoting Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers 
Int’l Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 949 F.2d 1241, 1259 n.15 (3d Cir. 
1991) (en banc)). 
2  “Forfeiture” and “waiver” are often treated as 
interchangeable terms. As I have explained elsewhere, they 
are not. See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 432 n.1 
(3d Cir. 2011) (Hardiman, J., concurring) (“Whereas 
forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, 
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 This requirement is not a mere formality. As my 
esteemed colleague recently wrote: “[t]here is good reason for 
this [rule]. Brief, casual references to arguments do not put 
the opposing party on adequate notice of the issue, nor do 
they develop it sufficiently to aid our review.” NLRB v. 
FedEx Freight, Inc., 2016 WL 4191498, at *11 (3d Cir. Aug. 
9, 2016) (Jordan, J., concurring).3 Indeed, this “is particularly 
true ‘where important and complex issues of law are 
presented, [making] a far more detailed exposition of [an] 
argument’” necessary to avoid forfeiting it. Id. (second 
alteration in original) (quoting Frank v. Colt Indus., Inc., 910 
F.2d 90, 100 (3d Cir. 1990)). This appeal presents just such a 
situation. 
 Avaya’s opening brief mentioned the taint issue only 
in passing. The matter received no mention in Avaya’s issues 
section of the brief, which I find significant because the 
question of whether the District Court erred in granting 
judgment as a matter of law against Avaya’s common law 
claims is an issue distinct from whether such error tainted the 
verdict on TLI’s antitrust claims—something the structure of 
the Majority opinion rightly makes clear. See United States v. 
Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 341–42 (3d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing 
between “issues” and “arguments”). Then, on the three 
occasions Avaya did mention tainting in its brief, its 
                                                                                                     
waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right.”) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
733 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 3 See also Rodriguez, 659 F.3d at 175 (“Judges are not 
mind-readers, so parties must spell out their issues clearly, 
highlighting the relevant facts and analyzing on-point 
authority.”). 
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argumentation was skeletal at best.4 This was not lost on TLI, 
which—in Avaya’s words—“crie[d] waiver” in its response 
brief. Avaya Reply Br. 18 n.4 (citing TLI Br. 87). Rightly so. 
As TLI put it, Avaya failed to “advance [its] conclusory 
                                              
4  Two of these instances were little more than ipse 
dixits. See Avaya Br. 4 (“The erroneous dismissal of Avaya’s 
claims and the court’s instruction that TLI[’s] conduct was 
not unlawful also tainted the jury’s consideration of TLI[’s] 
antitrust counterclaims.”); id. at 72 (“In any event, the 
erroneous instructions that tainted the jury’s consideration of 
TLI[’s] “FUD” allegations require a new trial.”). Neither of 
these assertions was supported by any reasoning or citation to 
legal authority or record evidence. The third mention of 
tainting offered a few sentences of additional bluster—
accusing the trial judge of “discredit[ing] Avaya in the jury’s 
eyes” and “crippl[ing] Avaya’s ability to respond to TLI[’s] 
antitrust claims by showing that it had legitimate and 
procompetitive business reasons” for its actions—but was 
purely skeletal. Id. at 43 (introductory paragraph to antitrust 
argument section). Avaya again offered no development of its 
theory or citation to case law or the trial record. Passing 
references like these should be deemed forfeited. See Bryant 
v. Gates, 532 F.3d 888, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that a 
claim was forfeited where it was made only in a “conclusory” 
manner because “[i]t is not enough merely to mention a 
possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court 
to do counsel’s work” (quoting N.Y. Rehab. Care Mgmt., LLC 
v. NLRB, 506 F.3d 1070, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 2007))); Donahue v. 
City of Boston, 304 F.3d 110, 122 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(determining that an argument was forfeited where the “main 
brief devote[d] only three sentences to the issue” that were 
“half-hearted” and “poorly developed”). 
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‘taint’ contention in a freestanding and developed argument.” 
TLI Br. 86. Because Avaya merely floated the taint idea 
“without squarely arguing it,” FedEx Freight, 2016 WL 
4191498, at *11 (Jordan, J., concurring), I would deem it 
forfeited. 
 The three-point tainting theory on which the Majority 
bases its decision comes not from Avaya’s opening brief but 
from its reply brief. See Avaya Reply Br. 18–19; Majority 
Op. 67–79. But the black-letter rule is that “[w]e will not 
revive a forfeited argument simply because” an appellant 
finally develops “it in its reply brief.” Republic of Argentina 
v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 n.2 (2014); see 
also In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003). This 
dooms at least two taint-related arguments developed only on 
reply: (1) that judgment as a matter of law against Avaya’s 
common law claims undermined Avaya’s ability to present 
pro-competitive justifications for its conduct, and (2) the 
related point that the District Court erroneously limited 
witness testimony to that effect. 
 Avaya did not couch its argument regarding the effects 
of the District Court’s instructions about the lawfulness of 
TLI’s access to maintenance commands on the jury’s 
consideration of the “fear, uncertainty, and doubt” (FUD) 
letters in terms of tainting until its reply brief. It did, however, 
raise this alleged instructional error in its separate argument 
that the jury could not have properly found that Avaya 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct in the PBX maintenance 
aftermarket. I address this argument below. As for the other 
grounds on which the Majority deems the antitrust verdict 
improper, I would hold them forfeited. 
II 
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 Even had Avaya adequately developed all three prongs 
of its taint argument, I would not conclude that the District 
Court’s errors constituted reversible error. First, the Majority 
concludes that the District Court’s instructions after its 
dismissal of Avaya’s common law claims undermined the 
jury’s ability to assess the reasonableness of Avaya’s actions 
in light of TLI’s allegedly unlawful conduct. It highlights the 
trial judge’s instruction that TLI’s “use of and access to 
[Avaya’s] maintenance software may not be considered by 
you as unlawful when deciding TLI[’s] claims against Avaya 
asserted in the counterclaim.” App. 4739.   
 Despite this instruction, Avaya had ample opportunity 
to present the jury with legitimate and procompetitive 
defenses for its actions, and those defenses did not depend on 
whether TLI’s conduct was so egregious as to be against the 
law. Indeed, Avaya’s persistent refrain to the jury was that the 
actions Avaya took against TLI were reasonable because TLI 
was an “unauthorized” PBX servicer undermining Avaya’s 
“procompetitive” Business Partners program. App. 4569–71.5 
                                              
 5 In its closing argument, after explaining to the jury 
that it would be instructed that “TLI’s use of and access to 
Avaya’s maintenance software may not be considered by you 
to have been unlawful” Avaya explained that “what remains 
is a series of decisions by you, as to whether Avaya’s conduct 
was a reasonable competitive reaction to the events Avaya 
confronted in the marketplace.” Trial Transcript (“Tr.”) 
3/19/14, 15752. It then proceeded to make the case that 
Avaya’s actions were nothing more than “legitimate efforts to 
protect its software and its business model,” id. at 15756;  that 
the law “allows for fierce, fierce competition,” id. at 15757; 
that Avaya’s practices were consistent with industry practices 
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Avaya made a thorough, sustained case for the legitimacy and 
procompetitiveness of its actions and did not pull any punches 
in lambasting TLI’s conduct. Accordingly, I think it quite 
unlikely that labeling TLI’s conduct “unlawful” on top of all 
this would have changed the result.  
 In a similar vein, the Majority finds taint in the 
constraints the District Court imposed on the evidence Avaya 
presented at trial. The Majority notes that Avaya “points to 
two examples in particular” of how the District Court’s 
judgment as a matter of law “hindered its ability to present 
evidence in its defense against the antitrust claims.”6 Majority 
Op. 75. The first is the District Court’s warning that Avaya 
could not “tell the jury” that TLI’s means of accessing Avaya 
PBX systems was “illegal” during its cross-examination of 
TLI’s CEO. App. 4440. My colleagues concede that “the 
Court did allow the line of questions,” Majority Op. 75, 
which was not directed toward criticizing TLI’s access 
practices, but rather, was offered to demonstrate that Avaya’s 
policy toward unauthorized service providers was consistent 
                                                                                                     
and business realities and that the Business Partner program 
enhanced competition in the marketplace; that its concerns 
about unauthorized PBX maintenance providers with no 
relationship to Avaya were legitimate because poor-quality 
servicing of Avaya PBX’s could damage the Avaya brand; 
and that TLI was the party with questionable practices given 
its choice to pursue Avaya maintenance customers without 
authorization rather than “play” by the “rules,” id. at 15767.  
 6  In doing so, it fails to mention that these two 
examples are drawn exclusively from Avaya’s reply brief—
the first time Avaya mentioned them in this appeal. Compare 
Majority Op. 75, with Avaya Reply Br. 19. 
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with industry practice and did not cause TLI any 
anticompetitive harm. Second, the Majority is troubled by the 
trial judge’s rather innocuous caveat to Avaya when 
examining its economics expert to “[s]tay away from trying 
to, in effect, contradict anything I’ve already decided.” App. 
4587. The Court again allowed Avaya’s line of questioning, 
deeming it “fair game” and unrelated to any allegations of 
illegality. App. 4586. This is unsurprising, given that the 
expert’s testimony was directed toward showing that TLI had 
in fact benefited from Avaya’s allegedly anticompetitive 
conduct because its Business Partners program made TLI the 
only independent game in town. I am at a loss to see how the 
ability to call TLI’s conduct “illegal” would have 
meaningfully advantaged Avaya in these lines of inquiry. And 
even if there were instances in which this characterization 
would have been of rhetorical benefit to Avaya, it would not 
have changed the substance of Avaya’s procompetitive-
justification argument.  
 Finally, I am not persuaded that the District Court’s 
instruction that it was not “unlawful,” App. 615, for TLI to 
access Avaya’s maintenance software tainted the jury’s 
consideration of whether the FUD letters constituted 
anticompetitive conduct. Among other things, these letters 
told Avaya customers that accessing PBX and PDS systems 
through unauthorized service providers “is a violation of 
federal and state laws and could result in civil and criminal 
liability and penalties” and that Avaya would “take all 
necessary legal action against violators.”  App. 6945; see also 
App. 3904–05, 3940, 4057–58, 7307. And with respect to 
these letters, the Court instructed the jury that “the law does 
not allow [TLI’s] injury to be based on . . . Avaya’s 
dissemination of truthful statements.” App. 621.  
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 Even if the jury had not been instructed that 
unauthorized access to Avaya software was not illegal, it is 
unlikely that it would have reached a different verdict. 
Avaya’s own witnesses admitted that they had no idea 
whether there was any legal basis for the letters Avaya sent to 
its PBX customers stating that unauthorized use of 
maintenance service permissions and logins “violat[es] . . . 
federal and state laws” and “could result in civil and criminal 
penalties.” And they conceded that Avaya did not actually 
plan to sue its customers. App. 3904–05, 3940, 4057–58. 
Even if some of the threats Avaya issued in its FUD letters 
might have been rooted in truth (the fact that use of an 
unauthorized service provider could result in the loss of 
certain services only provided by Avaya and its Business 
Partners certainly was), the jury’s inescapable conclusion was 
that at least some of these threats were not true. Indeed, in 
defending the letters, Avaya focused on the obvious truths 
(Avaya-exclusive benefits, TLI’s unauthorized status, etc.) 
yet conceded “the fact that a private party can’t possibly 
pursue criminal liability,” which is “for the public 
authorities.” Tr. 15871. Avaya characterized this 
misstatement of law as “unfortunate language,” id.; the jury 
surely recognized this as a euphemism for “not true.” Simply 
put, it was obvious to any fair-minded reader that the FUD 
letters were over-the-top, at least partially baseless, and 
threats that couldn’t fairly be described as “legal opinion.” 
Avaya Br. 66. I do not perceive a high probability that the 
jury would have found them kosher had it known that a 
customer’s hiring an unauthorized service provider might 
amount to a breach of contract. After all, it was instructed that 
even if “a truthful statement is coupled or limited with an 
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untruthful statement, the truthful statement loses its protection 
and can underlie an injury.” App. 621.7  
                                              
 7 Avaya’s primary attack on the FUD issue is that the 
jury instructions misstated the law by failing to inform the 
jury of “a presumption” assigning de minimis competitive 
effect to false statements that antitrust plaintiffs “must 
overcome” by meeting a six-factor test if they are to show a 
FUD practice to be anticompetitive. Avaya Br. 64 (citing 
American Prof’l Testing Serv. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, 108 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
Because our Court is not among those that have adopted this 
presumption and six requirements, see, e.g., Maurice E. 
Stucke, How Do (and Should) Competition Authorities Treat 
A Dominant Firm’s Deception?, 63 SMU L. Rev. 1069, 1086 
(2010), I would hold that the instructions were fine. I would 
also conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to 
find the FUD letters anticompetitive, especially given that 
such a finding has stronger foundation “when . . . combined 
with other anticompetitive acts” by Avaya. W. Penn 
Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 109 n.14 
(3d Cir. 2010). 
 To the extent that sufficient evidence also needed to 
support TLI’s other theory of liability (anticompetitive refusal 
to deal) given that the general verdict form does not indicate 
which of Avaya’s allegedly anticompetitive acts formed the 
basis for the verdict, I would hold—with some reservation—
that it does. The District Court’s instructions were consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s precedents setting forth the 
“limited circumstances in which a firm’s unilateral refusal to 
deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust liability,” Pac. 
Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 448 
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* * * 
 The Majority upends a sound verdict—reached after a 
decade of litigation and seven months of trial—based on a 
few snippets mentioned only in passing in Avaya’s opening 
brief. The Majority picks up the dropped ball and runs with it, 
imbuing Avaya’s taint argument with force it never pressed in 
its opening brief. And even had it done so, I would not hold 
that any error the District Court may have committed in the 
second month of the trial was fatal to the whole enterprise. 
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the decision to vacate 
the judgment in favor of TLI on its counterclaim for Avaya’s 
pre-2008 attempted monopolization of the PBX maintenance 
aftermarket. 
                                                                                                     
(2009), and my review of the record leads me to conclude that 
TLI provided that “minimum quantum of evidence from 
which a jury might reasonably afford relief.” Starceski v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1095 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 
1992)).  
